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I. INTRODUCTION
As an alternative to the metaphor of a forest—to capture the lack of
clarity of Erie jurisprudence—in which one can easily get lost among
the trees in the search for meaning and guidance for future decisions,
Justice Scalia, in the Supreme Court’s latest “Erie” offering in Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.,1 referred to
“Erie’s murky waters.”2 In Shady Grove, the Court fragmented into
several opinions3 that invite the reader into the forest—or, to mix
metaphors, the grove—in search of fruitful answers to questions
avoided, or unanswered, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,4
the Court’s last extensive treatment of “Erie” doctrine before Shady
Grove.
This article examines the fragments of Shady Grove and finds
significant guidance in answering one of the questions side-stepped by
the Court in Gasperini, namely the proper mode of analysis to employ
when a Federal Rule potentially comes into conflict with a state law
which, if not applied by the federal court in a diversity suit, could
substantially affect the outcome of litigation. While these fragments
may—or may not—yield a definitive “holding” in the strict stare decisis
sense of the term, they do offer a principled Middle Way5 to guide the

1. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
2. Id. at 1437.
3. Id. at 1436; id. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
4. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
5. “The Buddha claimed that the practices he advocated in the quest for enlightenment
avoided the extremes of sensual self-indulgence on the one hand and self-mortification on the other
and thus he gave his Noble Eightfold Path the alternative name of the Middle Way.” Glossary of
Buddhist Terms, BUDDHIST STUDIES:
BUDDHA DHARMA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION &
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Court in succeeding cases in calibrating the balance of power in judicial
federalism between the federal courts’ interest in uniform procedure and
the states’ interest in uniform intra-state enforcement of their substantive
policies.
The Court’s 1996 opinion in Gasperini is like a jurisprudential
version of a Rorschach test; commentators, looking for meaning, read
into it what they hoped to see.6 In Gasperini, the Court’s majority
counseled that federal courts should interpret the scope of Federal Rules
“with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.”7
But what is the extent of this sensitivity? What principles guide a court
in balancing the federal interest in procedural uniformity against state
substantive policy interests? Until Gasperini, the Court did not go out of
[its] way to avoid finding a conflict”8 between a Federal Rule and state
law, giving Federal Rules their “plain meaning.”9 Did Gasperini signal
the Court’s retreat from Hanna’s10 robust defense of the Rules Enabling
Act’s (REA) policy of federal procedural uniformity by narrowly
construing Federal Rule 59 to create room for a pragmatic Byrd-like11
accommodation of federal and state interests? In Gasperini, the Court,
in Solomonic fashion, split the difference by deferring to New York’s
interests in capping damage awards12 and the federal courts’ interest in
determining the appropriate division of labor between trial and appellate
courts.13
Some commentators, like Professor Freer, read Gasperini to signal
a resurrection of Byrd-balancing of state and federal interests:
“[R]eading between the lines of Gasperini, we can find that Byrd—writ

BUDDHANET, http://www.buddhanet.net/e-learning/dharmadata/fdd22.htm (last visited Oct. 11,
2010).
6. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think
the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 963, 964-65 (1998) (“Gasperini is beginning to seem like a palimpsest, into which
one can inscribe almost any meaning (good or bad) of one’s choosing.”).
7. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996).
8. Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 968.
9. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980).
10. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
11. “By recognizing three interests—(1) some federal systemic interest, (2) the state interest
in governing the primary activity of citizens, and (3) the litigant interest in uniformity of outcome—
and by embracing the concept of balancing, the Court reinvigorated principles of federalism in the
vertical choice of law equation.” Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After
Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1651 (1998).
12. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 430 n.12 .
13. Id. at 437.
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large—may have a strong future.”14 Others foresaw a limited role for
Byrd-balancing analysis.15 If indeed Gasperini can be interpreted as a
return to Byrd, what would this portend for federal rules uniformity?
While, in my view, Shady Grove signals a return to the Court’s preGasperini propensity not to read Federal Rules to avoid a conflict with
state law,16 the decision sheds no light on the continuing viability of
Byrd-balancing analysis,17 which is applicable only to resolve the
“relatively unguided Erie choice” under the Rules of Decision Act
(“RDA”);18 the Shady Grove majority “[did] not wade into Erie’s murky
waters” finding that Federal Rule 23 was applicable and valid under the
REA.19
Did Gasperini mark a return to pre-Hanna jurisprudence when,
under the sway of Guaranty Trust, courts bent over backwards to apply
state procedure over a Federal Rule to avoid a difference in litigation
outcome? As discussed in Part IV, the dissent in Shady Grove falls back
on an outcome determinative analysis under the RDA to conclude that
the federal court should apply the state rule in that case over Federal
Rule 23.20 Seeking to build upon Gasperini’s reliance on the outcome
determination approach, one commentator, reacting to the conservative
14. Freer, supra note 11, at 1660 . See also 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER
& EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4511 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2010) (“In
the wake of Gasperini, the most pressing question is whether the Court’s decision repudiates the
promise in Byrd that the federal judiciary would be an independent system for the administration of
justice. But despite Justice Scalia’s objections, the Court’s decision in Gasperini is a reasonable
attempt to perform the balancing of interests required by Byrd.”); C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A
Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 270 (1997) (“The
Gasperini majority relied centrally on Byrd. . . .”).
15. See, e.g., Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 1007 (“[M]uch as I may disagree with Professor
Floyd when he asserts that ‘[t]he Gasperini majority relied centrally on Byrd—for the Court does
not engage in Byrd-style balancing to decide on the allocation of trial- and appellate-level
responsibilities, and Byrd plays no role in the choice of standard for verdict-excessiveness review—
the opinion largely earns his criticism that ‘Byrd still lives, but we know not why, or to what
extent.’”); id. at 1009 (“So far . . . only a handful of post-Gasperini cases include substantial dealing
with Byrd, and they sometimes appropriately find no ‘essential characteristic’ involved or cast doubt
on whether the inquiry is suitable in the situation before the court.”).
16. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1463-64
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court veers away from [interpreting the Federal Rules with
sensitivity to important state interests]—and conspicuously, it’s most recent reiteration in Gasperini
. . .—in favor of a mechanical reading of Federal Rules, insensitive to state interests and productive
of discord.”).
17. Byrd is mentioned only once in passing in Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion. Id. at
1448 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that “the federal courts sitting in diversity operate as ‘an
independent system for administering justice . . . .’”).
18. Id. at 1448.
19. Id. at 1437.
20. See infra Part IV.
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tilt of the federal judiciary and, in particular, the recent pro-defendant
interpretation of pleading standards in Twombly21 and Iqbal,22 contends
that Gasperini charts a new direction in Erie, arguing that federal courts
in diversity suits are required to apply state judicial interpretations of
Federal Rules, notwithstanding the REA.23 In my view, such a
prediction is premature after Shady Grove which, when the pieces of the
puzzle are put together, moderates Gasperini’s potential to undermine
the congressionally-mandated policy of Federal Rules uniformity.
Another issue unresolved in Gasperini is the role of the so-called
“substantive rights” proviso as an additional limit on the validity of
Federal Rules under § 2072(b) of the REA. In 1941, the Court in
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.24 announced a single test for determining the
validity and applicability of the Federal Rules that focused solely on
whether the Rule “really regulates procedure,” declining to attribute
independent force to the “substantive rights” proviso.25 For seventy
years, since Sibbach, the Supreme Court essentially ignored this proviso.
During this period, Hanna expressly reaffirmed Sibbach as the test for
rule validity in 1965.26 Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper, critical of
Sibbach’s cavalier approach to state substantive polices, expressed the
hope that, after Hanna, the Court would breathe life into the “substantive
rights” proviso in Gasperini.27 This hope was unfulfilled. But, in Shady

21. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
22. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
23. See generally Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean
for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 287 (2008).
24. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
25. Id. at 14 (“The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure, the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”).
26. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4509 (“Although the Supreme Court never has addressed
the question specifically, it so far has not seemed inclined to attribute much significance to the
‘substantive rights’ proviso. In Hanna, for example, the standard endorsed by the Court for
determining the validity and applicability of the Civil Rules was the test announced in Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., according to which the critical question is simply whether a Rule ‘really regulates
procedure.’”).
27. Id. (“[T]here is reason to believe that the Supreme Court, should it have occasion to
address specifically the relationship between the constitutional and the statutory restrictions on the
permissible scope of the Civil Rules, will disapprove the suggestion in Hanna that the Sibbach test
is the appropriate standard for determining both the constitutionality of a Civil Rule and its validity
under the Enabling Act. . . . By virtue of the ‘substantive rights’ proviso in the statute, it is not
sufficient that a Civil Rule relate to practice and procedure; in addition, it cannot ‘abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right.’”); id. § 4511 (referring to “one question presented by the
Gasperini case,” which was pending before the Court at the date of publication, whether Rule 59
controlled “the standard of review of a jury’s damage award”: “If Rule 59 does encompass that
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Grove, the combined effect of Justice Stevens’s pivotal concurrence and
the dissent may augur a modification of Sibbach’s approach.28
Part II will sketch the facts of the case to prepare for an exploration
of the roots of Shady Grove in Part III, which traces the evolution of the
Court’s Erie jurisprudence. At various points along the way, I will stop
to anticipate where one or more of the several opinions in Shady Grove
will shed light, in Part IV, on the meaning of Shady Grove.
II. A SYNOPSIS OF SHADY GROVE
Shady Grove filed a diversity suit against Allstate in the Eastern
District of New York claiming individually unpaid statutory interest of
$500 owed by Allstate on overdue insurance benefits and on behalf of a
class of all others to whom Allstate owed statutory interest, in Justice
Ginsburg’s words, “transform[ing] a $500 case into a $5,000,000
award.”29 A subsection of New York’s class-action rule—CPLR §
901(b)—located in the state’s procedural code provided that “an action
to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or
imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.”30 The
district court dismissed the suit for failing to satisfy the $75,000 amount
in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, concluding that
statutory interest is a “penalty” within the meaning of CPLR § 901(b)
which, therefore, barred the proposed class action.31 The Second Circuit
affirmed, holding (1) that no conflict exists between Rule 23 and CPLR
§ 901(b) because they addresses different issues: Rule 23 addresses
whether a class action is certifiable while CPLR § 901(b) “addresses an
antecedent question: whether the particular type of claim is eligible for
class treatment in the first place,” and (2) that CPLR § 901(b) is a
“substantive” rule within the meaning of Erie.32
A fragmented Court, by a majority of five, reversed and remanded
the case, holding that Federal Rule 23 and the state rule do conflict
because both addresses the same issue—whether Shady Grove is

standard, then the federal courts must apply a federal standard unless that standard would abridge,
enlarge, or modify a substantive right in violation of the Rules Enabling Act.” (emphasis added)).
28. See infra Part IV.
29. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1460 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring). But see id. at 1459 n.18 (“Justice Ginsburg asserts that class certification
in this matter would ‘transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award.’ But in fact, class certification
would transform 10,000 $500 cases into one $5,000,000 case.” (internal citations omitted)).
30. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b).
31. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437.
32. Id. at 1437-38 (emphasis added).
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authorized to “maintain” a class action33—and, further, that Rule 23 was
“valid” under the REA and, therefore, preempts the state rule.34 The
Court’s majority—which included Justice Stevens, who concurred in
Justice Ginsburg’s Opinion of the Court in Gasperini—declined her
invitation to narrowly construe Rule 23 to accommodate the substantive
policy goals behind CPLR § 901(b).35
Although the Court fragmented into five opinions, these opinions
do not align with the usual ideological, liberal-conservative fault lines.36
The Court’s opinion in Parts I and II-A, authored by Justice Scalia, was
joined by two other conservative Justices—Roberts and Thomas—as
well as two liberal Justices—Justice Sotomayor, a Democratic
appointee, and Justice Stevens.37 A plurality opinion in Parts II-B and
II-D, also authored by Justice Scalia, which Justice Stevens did not join,
affirmed Sibbach’s “really regulates procedure” test pursuant to which
“compliance of a Federal Rule with the Enabling Act is to be assessed
by consulting the rule itself, and not its effects in individual
applications.”38 In Part II-C, Justice Scalia wrote a plurality opinion that
responded specifically to Justice Stevens’s concurrence, which Justice
Sotomayor did not join.39 Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, joined
by Justice Alito, a conservative, Justice Kennedy, a moderateconservative, and Justice Breyer, a liberal, narrowly construed Rule 23
to avoid a collision with CPLR § 901(b) and applied the outcome
determinative test to conclude that New York’s class action rule was
“substantive” under Erie40 and, as the dissent was interpreted by the
plurality41 and Justice Stevens,42 the REA. Justice Stevens wrote a

33. Id. at 1438-39.
34. Id. at 1437.
35. Id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring).
36. The apolitical approach to federalism in Shady Grove runs counter to the view of some
scholars that politics drive contemporary views of judicial federalism in light of the procedural
disparities between federal and state courts. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 23, at 248.
37. For identification of Supreme Court Justices by ideological perspective, see generally
William E. Nelson, Harvey Rishikof, I. Scott Messinger & Michael Jo, The Liberal Tradition of the
Supreme Court Clerkship: Its Rise, Fall, and Reincarnation?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1749 (2009).
38. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 1435.
40. Id. at 1469 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 1442 (“What the dissent’s approach achieves is not the avoiding of a ‘conflict
between Rule 23 and § 901(b),’ . . . but rather the invalidation of Rule 23 (pursuant to § 2072(b) of
the Rules Enabling Act) to the extent that it conflicts with the substantive policies of § 901.”).
42. Id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“At bottom, the dissent’s interpretation of Rule 23
seems to be that Rule 23 covers only those cases in which its application would create no Erie
problem. The dissent would apply the Rules of Decision Act inquiry under Erie even to cases in
which there is a governing federal rule, and thus the Act, by its own terms, does not apply.”); id. at
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concurring opinion that positioned him at the Court’s center. He agreed
with the dissent that the REA’s “substantive rights” proviso required the
Court to characterize the state rule as “substantive” or “procedural” in
determining the validity of Rule 23 as applied to preempt the state rule,43
but concurred with the plurality that the state rule was “procedural” and,
therefore, not “substantive” under the REA’s “substantive rights”
proviso.44 He disagreed with Justice Ginsburg who, in his words,
“would apply the Rules of Decision Act[’s outcome determination]
inquiry under Erie even to cases in which there is a governing federal
rule, and thus the Act, by its own terms, does not apply.”45
Although some may opine that the Court once again missed its
chance to provide relatively clear guidance on “Erie-Hanna”—as it did,
some posit, in Gasperini46—this article will demonstrate—reading
between the lines—that Shady Grove does provide some useful doctrinal
guidance. In calibrating the judicial balance of power between federal
and state interests, the Court’s majority reaffirmed—in light of
Gasperini, one might say re-established—the vitality of the REA’s
policy of federal procedural uniformity in diversity actions, by holding
that Rule 23—a federal rule with powerful outcome impact on the
enforcement of state-created rights—controlled the issue in dispute, was
valid, and, therefore, preempted New York’s conflicting, and outcome
determinative, class action rule.47 Another majority, comprising Justice
Stevens and the four dissenting Justices, may signify a modification of
the Court’s unnecessarily rigid approach under Sibbach to Federal Rule
validity by breathing some life into the “substantive rights” proviso,
qualified, however, by Justice Stevens’s pivotal concurrence that
narrowly interpreted the reach of the proviso to exclude merely outcome
determinative state law.48 And, as explained in Part IV, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent in Shady Grove may, in turn, serve to provide some
1459 (“It is an incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins constitutes the
appropriate test of . . . the applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.”).
43. Id. at 1451 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[The Enabling] Act requires, inter alia, that federal
rules ‘not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right’. . . . Unlike Justice Scalia, I believe that
an application of a federal rule that effectively abridges, enlarges, or modifies a state-created right
or remedy violates this command.” (emphasis in original)).
44. Id. at 1459-60 (Stevens, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 1456.
46. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 11, at 1663 (“[T]he Supreme Court has a duty to set
meaningful precedent. In Gasperini, the Court had another opportunity—perhaps the best in a
generation—to make a meaningful contribution to RDA analysis, including the role of Byrd.
Instead, the Court has left the field about as murky as it was before.”).
47. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448.
48. Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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clarity to our understanding of her opinion in Gasperini, which one
commentator criticized as leaving “the field about as murky as it was
before.”49
III. THE ROOTS OF SHADY GROVE: “ERIE” JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
OSCILLATING PENDULUM50 OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM BETWEEN
FEDERAL AND STATE INTERESTS
The Supreme Court’s 1938 landmark decision in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins,51 overturning a century of precedent in Swift v. Tyson,52
revolutionized our concept of judicial federalism.53 The limited purpose
of this section is to sketch enough of the tortuous path of “Erie”
jurisprudence, from Erie itself through Guaranty Trust to Gasperini, to
aid in understanding the doctrinal implications of Shady Grove by
situating the various positions taken by the Justices in that case at
various points along the path’s twists and turns. Themes that thread
through Erie jurisprudence over its seventy-two-year metamorphosis
also weave through Shady Grove. “Erie’s” oscillating pendulum is the
product of the Court’s ongoing attempt to find the “right” judicial
balance of power between federal and state interests that, in turn, has
been influenced by differing concepts of federalism among the
Justices.54 It has been observed that federalism is a fluid notion that is

49. Freer, supra note 11, at 1663.
50. For an example of the swinging pendulum metaphor to describe the Supreme Court’s
oscillation between sensitivity to state substantive interests and the federal interest in procedural
uniformity, see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4508 (referring to Justice Harlan’s concern in his
concurring opinion in Hanna v. Plumer that the majority went too far “by sanctifying unduly and
rendering inviolate the federal rules”: “But has the pendulum [in Hanna] swung too far? In a
separate concurring opinion, Justice Harlan suggested that it has.”). See also John Hart Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 696 (1974) (“[T]he pendulum that had begun in
Byrd to swing back toward the teaching of Erie swung too far . . . in Chief Justice Warren’s opinion
for the Court in Hanna v. Plumer.”).
51. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
52. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
53. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins was not
an endeavor to formulate scientific legal terminology. It expressed a policy that touches vitally the
proper distribution of judicial power between State and federal courts.”); WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 14, § 4503 (“It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins. . . . [I]t goes to the heart of the relationship between the
federal government and the states, and returns to the states a power that for nearly a century had
been exercised by the federal government.”); see LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 440 (4th ed. 2009) (“The Court [in Erie] seemed to treat the problem created by the
Swift doctrine as exclusively one of federalism.”).
54. Steinman, supra note 23, at 308 (“[[T]he cases that have come to constitute Erie’s
doctrinal ‘progeny’] are principally about procedural federalism.”).
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shaped by historical forces55 including the changing social, economic,
and political environment.56 The shifting balance of power also reflects
the tension between formalism and legal realism and the corresponding
tension inherent in the dichotomy57 between “substance” and
“procedure” in classifying law for choice of law purposes, including
“Erie.”58
These tensions are starkly manifest in Shady Grove. Formalists59
value rules and tend to view procedure as normatively distinct from
substance.60 Realists61 tend to be rule-skeptics62 who view procedure as
55. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA
185 (2000) (“Erie’s positivism was based on a practical recognition of the changing demands of
constitutional federalism. It was part of a broader working approach that sought to adapt the
architecture of American government to the challenges of a new, expanding, and dynamic interstate
society.”); Susan Bandes, Book Note, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 877 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND
THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000)) (“The abstract
notion of federalism merely drives the influence of history underground and deprives all those
affected of the opportunity to decide whether any particular version of federalism ought to retain its
hold. It would be more sensible to look to history for help identifying the forces that have shaped
and reshaped the notion of federalism over time.”).
56. Steinman, supra note 23, at 248 (“Our septuagenarian Erie finds itself in a political and
judicial environment that is eerily similar to the one prevailing at its birth. Then, as now, corporate
and business interests tend to favor federal court, while their political and litigation adversaries tend
to favor state court. . . . These procedural disparities are at the core of the contemporary politics of
judicial federalism.”).
57. “Substance” and “procedure” are not mutually exclusive concepts since statutes often
contain substantive and procedural aspects. See Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of
Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 812-18 (2010) (“Dichotomy in Disarray”); David
Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 415 (2010) (“[T]o jurisprudes like Thurman Arnold, the [substanceprocedure] dichotomy eroded long ago. Perhaps more significantly, the politics of rulemaking since
the 1970s has, in practical terms, dissolved a definable boundary in practice between substance and
procedure.”).
58. See, e.g., Main, supra note 57, at 812 (“Today . . . a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is not
a valid procedural rule under the Rules Enabling Act if it abridges, enlarges or modifies a
substantive right. In diversity cases, the Erie doctrine requires federal courts to apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law. Closely related to the vertical choice of law context in
Erie is the horizontal choice of law; a court usually applies the procedural law of the forum even
when it applies the substantive law of another jurisdiction.”).
59. Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World
Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, The Legal Workshop, CORNELL L. REV., Jan. 15, 2010,
available at http://legalworkshop.org/2010/01/15/varieties-of-new-legal-realism-can-a-new-worldorder-prompt-a-new-legal-theory ( “[B]y formalism we mean a theory of law based on rationally
organized first principles deductively applied.”).
60. On the existence of procedural norms distinct from substance, see Steven S. Gensler, The
Role and Future of the Federal Rules: Justness! Speed! Inexpense! An Introduction to The
Revolution of 1938 Revisited: The Role and Future of the Federal Rules, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 271
(2008) (noting the procedural norms expressed in Federal Rule 1: “Rulemaking that flows from our
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thinly disguised substance. Realism eschews a priori classifications of
laws as procedural or substantive.63 Formalism in the procedural context

Rule 1 ideals—the just, speedy, and inexpensive administration of the law—is not without its
benefits. . . . [I]t also bears mentioning that modern rule-drafting and rulemaking bodies continue to
invoke the norms of justness, speed, and efficiency.”). See also Robert G. Bone, The Process of
Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO.
L.J. 887, 894 (1999) (“[P]roponents of court rulemaking believed that procedure was normatively
distinct from and subordinate to substantive law. . . . [T]he values relevant to procedural
rulemaking were not substantive in nature. They were practical values of administrative design,
such as efficiency (understood narrowly as minimizing administrative cost), simplicity, and
flexibility.”); Ely, supra note 50, at 724 n.168 (1974) (suggesting a distinctly procedural norm to
define “procedure” as used in the REA, “a statute directed not so much to identity of outcome as to
the creation of a uniform and enlightened practice for federal courts”). Id. at 724-25 (“We were all
brought up on sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the line between substance and procedure. But
the realization that the terms carry no monolithic meaning at once appropriate to all the contexts in
which courts have seen fit to employ them need not imply that they can have no meaning at all.
And they are the terms the Enabling Act uses. We have, I think, some moderately clear notion of
what a procedural rule is—one designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient
mechanism for the resolution of disputes. Thus, one way of doing things may be chosen over
another because it is thought to be more likely to get at the truth, or better calculated to give the
parties a fair opportunity to present their sides of the story, or because, and this may point quite the
other way, it is a means of promoting the efficiency of the process. Or the protection of the process
may proceed at wholesale, as by keeping the size of the docket at a level consistent with giving
those cases that are heard the attention they deserve.”).
61. Legal Realism is a rather amorphous concept. See Roy L. Brooks, Structures of Judicial
Decision Making from Legal Formalism to Critical Theory 90 (2d ed. 2005) (citing Karl Llewellyn,
Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1254 (1931)) (“For all of its influence, legal
realism is something of a mystery. Karl Llewellyn, one of legal realism’s central figures, insisted in
1931 that there is no realist ‘school,’ only a congeries of perspectives that have left and right
wings.”).
62. Brooks, supra note 61, at 90-91 (“All legal realists are rule-skeptic and fact-skeptic.
[R]ule-skepticism is the belief that law is not a body of rules but a set of facts that give rise to
competing policy choices.”). Legal realism’s aversion to rules has powerfully influenced conflicts
jurisprudence since the mid-twentieth century. For a discussion of the impact of legal realism’s
rule-skepticism on conflicts jurisprudence, see Symeon C. Symeonides, American Choice of Law at
the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 70 (2001) (“As happens in many
revolutions, the established system was demolished rather than repaired. The spectacular
deficiencies of the Restatement [of Conflicts] rules, coupled with the influence of American Legal
Realism, which was the philosophical school of choice of most conflicts revolutionaries, provoked
an overreaction against any rules.” (emphasis added)).
63. Edgar H. Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH. L. REV. 392,
393 (1940-41) (“To the realist, an a priori distinction between substance and procedure is
meaningless jargon; subject to possible limitations imposed by public policy, [Karl Llewellyn]
asserts that every rule of foreign law which bears materially upon the interests of the parties should
be freely imported.”); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (“Matters of ‘substance’
and matters of ‘procedure’ are much talked about in the books as though they defined a great divide
cutting across the whole domain of law. But, of course, ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the same
keywords to very different problems. Neither ‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same
invariants. Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is
used.”).
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values predictability of result, cabining judicial discretion.64 Realism
values substantive justice—achieving the “right” result in the individual
case but often at the expense of predictability and uniformity.65 These
different formalist and realist perspectives on substance and procedure
persist in current scholarly and judicial discourse66 and are reflected in
the opposing viewpoints between the Court’s majority and the dissent in
Shady Grove.67 Realists, therefore, tend to view procedural uniformity
as illusory;68 the Federal Rules vest so much discretion in judges that the
text of the rules does not provide uniformity of result in procedural
decisions.69 Therefore, in engaging in the “Erie” sport of characterizing
rules as “procedural” or “substantive,” formalists tend to broadly

64. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989)
(“And the trouble with the discretion-conferring approach to judicial law making is that it does not
satisfy this sense of justice very well. When a case is accorded a different disposition from an
earlier one, it is important, if the system of justice is to be respected, not only that the later case be
different, but that it be seen to be so.”); id. at 1179 (explaining the formalist’s predilection for
general rules that constrain political or policy preferences of judges: “For when, in writing for the
majority of the Court, I adopt a general rule, and say, ‘This is the basis of our decision,’ I not only
constrain lower courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next case should have such different facts
that my political or policy preferences regarding the outcome are quite the opposite, I will be unable
to indulge those preferences; I have committed myself to the governing principle.”).
65. Main, supra note 57, at 815 (“A functional approach purported to offer sufficient
flexibility to consider all of the variables implicated in any particular application of the substanceprocedure distinction. But, of course, flexibility cannot be achieved without severely compromising
the values of predictability and uniformity.”).
66. See Bone, supra note 60, at 888, 900-07 (chronicling the attack, since the 1970’s, on the
concept of procedural uniformity and the rejection of “the idea that civil process is normatively
independent of substance.”).
67. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1440-41
(2010).
68. Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 715 (1998) (“Federal Rules that avoid policy choices
and that in essence chart ad hoc decision-making by trial judges are uniform and hence transsubstantive in only the most trivial sense.”).
69. See David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a
Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433, 461 (2010) (“Realists wanted rules that would
guide judges to decisions with good concrete results but, nonetheless, vest them with the discretion
that made them assume responsibility for results.”); Stephen N. Subrin, Professors’ View: The
Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All”
Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 391 (2010) (“Professor Burbank has pointed out: ‘Many of
the Federal Rules authorize essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are trans-substantive in only
the most trivial sense.’ To put it another way, in order to meet the goal of having the same rules for
all cases, the drafters were forced to draft general rules, with a good deal of discretion inherent in
them, giving little direction to judges and in turn, to lawyers. Consequently, similar cases and
situations are apt to be treated quite differently, depending on the judge. Since we now know that
procedural decisions can, and often do, materially influence substantive application, the rules cannot
provide uniformity of result.”).
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construe the former term and realists broadly construe the latter. This
phenomenon, too, surfaces in Shady Grove.70
A.

Erie Realigns the Judicial Balance of Power in Favor of State
Substantive Interests

Under the RDA, “[t]he laws of the several States, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply.”71 At issue in Swift and, 100 years later, in Erie, was the meaning
of the phrase “laws of the several states.”72 The Court in Swift held that
“laws” was “strictly limited to local statutes and local usages . . . of a
fixed and permanent operation”73 and does not extend to decisions of
state courts on general commercial law which are “at most, only
evidence of what the laws are.”74 In reversing Swift’s formalist concept
of a “transcendental body of law”75 that judges discovered rather than
created,76 Erie reflected a legal realist perspective that law is what the
judges say it is77 and, in the absence of a controlling federal statute, state

70. Compare Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (“What matters is what the rule itself regulates:
If it governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the litigants’ rights are ‘enforced,’ it is
valid; if it alters ‘the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not.”),
with id. at 1458 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t is necessary to distinguish between procedural rules
adopted for some policy reason and seemingly procedural rules that are intimately bound up in the
scope of a substantive right or remedy.” (emphasis original)).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
72. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842).
73. Id. at 18-19.
74. Id. at 19.
75. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
76. Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1475 & n.84 (1997) (“This conception of general
common law drew heavily upon Blackstone’s Commentaries, which maintained that common law
existed independent of judicial decisions and was based on ‘natural justice’ and ‘the established
custom of the realm.’”). See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES; William R. Casto, The
Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907, 913 (1988). But
see Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV.
673, 683 (1998) (“It is doubtful that Swift represented a commitment to our belief in the ‘brooding
omnipresence’ theory later attributed to it by Holmes and Erie.”).
77. See Laura Kalman, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 21 (1986) (“[W]hen
Llewellyn defined law as ‘what officials do about disputes,’ and when Frank said that ‘if the judges
come to a ‘wrong’ result, their decision is none the less law,’ realists appeared to espouse a
sweeping ethical relativism that denied the existence of a higher law that provided judges with
moral guidance.”); K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 89-91 (1931) (“[W]hat appellate judges
do is vastly more important than what appellate judges say.”); see, e.g., id. at 82-83 (1933).
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substantive common law is as authoritatively binding on federal courts
as state statutory law.78
Erie did not restrict federal courts’ authority over their own
procedure and, “[f]or seven years it was supposed that Erie drew a line
between ‘substance’ and ‘procedure,’ with the former governed by state
law in diversity cases and the latter subject to federal law.”79 Four years
before Erie, Congress enshrined the “substance-procedure” dichotomy in
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 (“REA”) by delegating authority to the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of “practice and procedure” for the
federal courts which cannot, however, “abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”80 Three years after the Federal Rules became
effective, the Supreme Court confirmed the robust power of the federal
courts over their own procedure in Sibbach v. Wilson & Company.81
Consistent with Erie’s implicit dichotomy between substance and
procedure,82 Sibbach affirmed the broad sweep of the term “procedure”
in determining the validity of a Federal Rule under the REA.83 Seventy
78. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2006)
(“In Erie the Court overruled Swift v. Tyson, explaining that ‘what has been termed the general law
of the country’—and what Swift had described as a search for ‘the true’ or ‘just rule’—is ‘often little
less than what the judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should be the general law on a
particular subject.’ Once it became clear that judges were making law, rather than finding it, it
became impossible for the Court to continue substituting its views on state law matters for those of
state courts.”).
79. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4508 (“Although Justice Brandeis did not mention
‘procedure’ in his opinion for the Court [in Erie], Justice Reed, in his concurring opinion,
completed the dichotomy by observing that ‘no one doubts federal power over procedure.’”). But
see Ely, supra note 50, at 708 (“A considerable body of nostalgic literature to the contrary, Erie did
not indicate that ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ were the keys to interpreting the [Rules of Decision]
Act.”).
80. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (a) & (b). See Hon. Charles E. Clark, State
Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267,
288 (1946) (“The dichotomy of substance and procedure has had more discussion than any other
single feature of the Tompkins doctrine. This was natural in view of the general importance of the
subject; but it was made more dramatic by reason of the fact that four months earlier the Supreme
Court had adopted rules of civil procedure, effective only several months later; designed to make
uniform the procedure in all the federal courts throughout the country.”).
81. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1940).
82. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4508 (“Implicit in the Court’s opinion in Sibbach is the
assumption that matters of procedure and matters of substance are, in the words of [Justice
Frankfurter’s] dissent, ‘mutually exclusive categories with easily ascertainable contents,’ . . . .”); id.
(“At the time, the Sibbach standard for determining the validity of a Civil Rule corresponded
closely with the prevailing interpretation of the decision in Erie v. Tompkins and the rule it
announced for applying state law under the Rules of Decision Act.”).
83. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14. Sibbach’s test of Federal Rule validity was “whether a rule
really regulates procedure, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”
Id.
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years later, in Shady Grove, the reach of Sibbach’s broad interpretation
of the REA would divide the Court. Drawing “the line” between
“substance and procedure” in the context of the REA and the Erie
context of the RDA, as part of the larger tension between the federal
interest in uniform procedure and state interest in uniform intra-state
enforcement of substantive rights and remedies, has bedeviled the Court
since Erie and, as discussed in the Part IV, still does in Shady Grove.84
Erie realigned the federal-state judicial balance of power85 and,
together with the tortuous path of its progeny, has been portrayed “as a
prism through which to view the evolving concept of federalism.”86
Professor John Hart Ely, in his influential article,87 wrote that Erie
“implicates, indeed perhaps it is, the very essence of our federalism.”88
One writer commented that Swift and Erie essentially reflect different
stages in the evolution of American federalism:
Swift enabled litigants and judges to determine the proper division of
power between states and federal government at a time when states
were insular, parochial, and inclined to view themselves as small
nations, and when the United States was struggling to assert its
national authority both internally and against the world. Erie, on the
other hand, dealt with an established nation where federal authority
had been asserted and challenged, and where it had prevailed. In the
process, the states had dissolved into comparative insignificance. The
end of the Lochner era in 1937, and the development of the Erie
doctrine in 1938, helped to restore eroded state power and prepare for a
realignment of state and federal areas of concern.89

Professors Wright, Miller and Cooper observed that “[p]robably no
Supreme Court decision rendered during [the twentieth century] has had

84. See infra Part IV.
85. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (interpreting the policy expressed by
Erie as “touch[ing] vitally the proper distribution of judicial power between State and federal
courts.”); Clark, supra note 81, at 269 (commenting that Erie “touches . . . the nature of our federal
system and the difficulties of adjusting the spheres of authority of two independent, co-ordinate, and
largely competitive sovereignties operating in the same territory . . . .”).
86. Bandes, supra note 55, at 830 (referring to the “changing social dynamics that engendered
and then constantly reinvented the Erie doctrine.”).
87. Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 969 (referring to Professor Ely’s The Irrepressible Myth of Erie
as an “illuminating and deservedly influential article”).
88. Ely, supra note 50, at 695.
89. Herbert Hovenkamp, Book Note, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 215 (1982) (reviewing Tony
Freyer, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM
(1981)). See also Clark, supra note 80, at 276 (“[T]he Tyson rule came in as a gradual and not
unnatural development in balancing and adjusting the national against the local interests of that day
and period.”).
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as significant an impact on the distribution of judicial power between the
federal government and the states as has Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins.”90 In Shady Grove, Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion
will refer to the “Court’s erosion of Erie’s federalism grounding.”91
Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie has also been viewed in political
terms “as a Progressive and New Deal move against lawmaking by what
had been a conservative federal judiciary, and against the corporations
that had gained the benefit of that lawmaking through their access to
diversity jurisdiction.”92 In chronicling the Progressive roots of Erie,
Professor Purcell observed that Justice Brandeis’s opinion was, in part,
motivated by his belief in “the virtues of a decentralized federalism”93
and his opposition to the Rules Enabling Act.94 “By overruling Swift,
the Court would establish a new area of decentralized authority and
counterbalance the new centralizing Federal Rules.”95 Politics continues
to inform the dialogue about the judicial balance of power.96 One writer,
referring to the “contemporary politics of judicial federalism,”97 argues
that the continued evolution of Erie jurisprudence “finds itself in a
political and judicial environment that is eerily similar to the one
prevailing at its birth” and proposes an interpretation of Erie

90. Wright et al., supra note 14, § 4503; See also FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 168 (5th ed. 2001) (“[O]ne can see the [Erie]
decision as grounded in federalism and protecting the right of states to shape their own law in their
own courts, with federal law stepping in only when Congress so decides.”). Erie has also been
viewed from a separation of powers perspective as establishing “the constitutional primacy of the
legislature” over the judicial branch. PURCELL, JR., supra note 55, at 165. “Brandeis . . . wanted to
establish the principle that the mere possibility of valid congressional legislation was by itself
insufficient to authorize the national courts to make law in an area. Congress, not the courts, should
determine when and where national lawmaking authority was exercised.” Id. at 173.
91. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1473 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
92. FLEMING ET AL., supra note 90, at 167; Hovenkamp, supra note 89, at 224 (“Erie had an
imposing legal and constitutional content, but it had a powerful cultural content as well. The Erie
doctrine was a product of the New Deal (or of the reaction to the New Deal). It was a product of
legal realism and of the scientific instrumentalism of the age. Erie was much more than a decision
about forum-shopping.”).
93. PURCELL, JR., supra note 55, at 134.
94. Id. at 135.
95. Id. at 136.
96. See Bandes, supra note 55, at 836 (criticizing the formalism of the Rehnquist Court’s New
Federalism that, according to the writer, did not defend its value choices about the appropriate
balance of federal and state power).
97. Steinman, supra note 23, at 248 (“While Erie put state and federal courts on equal footing
when it came to the substantive elements of the litigants’ claims and defenses, the conventional
wisdom is that it did not eliminate disparities with respect to many aspects of civil procedure.
These procedural disparities are at the core of the contemporary politics of judicial federalism.”).
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jurisprudence after Gasperini that aims to shift the judicial balance
toward plaintiff-friendly state courts.98
As noted earlier, Erie has also been viewed as representing a
jurisprudential shift from nineteenth century legal formalism,99 whereby
judges discover law through deductive reasoning from “first
principles,”100 to the rule-skepticism of legal realism. Viewed through
the lens of realism, the Federal Rules’ concept of transsubstantive
“procedure” as normatively distinct from substantive law is theoretically
bankrupt and simply masks political choices.101 A new generation of
legal scholars appears to have taken up the banner of legal realism in
challenging the viability of uniform and transsubstantive procedure.102
This formalist-realist tension reappears in Shady Grove to divide the
Court between Justices who broadly construe the Federal Rules and the
meaning of “procedure” under § 2072(a) of the REA—shifting the
judicial balance in favor of federal rules uniformity—and those who

98. Id.
99. Molot, supra note 78, at 17-18 (“Where nineteenth-century formalism had supplied the
rationale for the federal courts’ aggressive approach to state law matters in Swift and post-Swift
cases, twentieth-century legal realism led the Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins to relinquish
its influence over state law.”); Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of
Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 115-16 (1993)
(“But the change that finally brought about Erie and Klaxon was a revolution in legal philosophy.
By the time Erie and Klaxon were decided, the Supreme Court, and the American legal
consciousness generally, were dominated by legal positivists and realists. To the positivists and the
realists, the notion of a ‘general’ law was nonsense. The positivist conception of law, derived
largely from John Austin’s lectures on jurisprudence, defined law as a command of a sovereign. In
this system, there is no room for a corpus of law without an identifiable sovereign. As Justice
Holmes argued in a famous dissent, ‘[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky,
but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified.’”).
100. Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 59 (“[B]y formalism we mean a theory of law based on
rationally organized first principles deductively applied.”).
101. Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 395, 431 (1995) (“In Justice Holmes’ conception, in the emerging language of the time, the
common law flowed not from a fact of science but (at least in part) from a choice of politics, where
‘politics’ is simply that which now appears fundamentally contestable, up for grabs. In Justice
Holmes’ view, the rhetoric of the common law was masking a fundamentally political reality about
what law was.”).
102. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 23; Marcus, supra note 57, at 415 (“Trans-substantivity in
the early twenty-first century is a paradox of sorts. It lacks a solid theoretical foundation. The
principle depends on the substance-procedure dichotomy as its jurisprudential prerequisite. But to
jurisprudes like Thurman Arnold, the dichotomy eroded long ago. Perhaps more significantly, the
politics of rulemaking since the 1970s has, in practical terms, dissolved a definable boundary in
practice between substance and procedure. Also, the normative assumption long made as to the
purpose of procedural rules, another theoretical underpinning, cannot survive unchallenged. Transsubstantive rules do not privilege any area of law, reflecting the notion, as lawyers like Charles
Clark and Roscoe Pound advocated, that procedural rules should have no purpose but to implement
policy choices made in the substantive law efficiently.” (emphasis added)).
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stress the substantive impact of procedure under § 2072(b) of the REA,
tipping the balance toward accommodating state substantive interests at
the expense of federal procedural uniformity.

B.

From Formalism to Realism under Guaranty Trust: A Functional
Approach to the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy Shifts the
Judicial Balance Further toward State Substantive Interests103

In the same year that Sibbach confirmed that “procedure” was the
domain of the Federal Rules under the REA, and five years before
Guaranty Trust “substantially redefined the Erie doctrine”104 under the
RDA to require federal courts to apply outcome determinative state
procedure, Charles E. Clark, chief drafter of the Federal Rules,105
warned “that the federal rules may be decidedly endangered if certain
views of the wide scope of substance and the narrow extent of procedure
which have been expressed should prevail . . . .”106 His prediction was
not unfounded.
For the first seven years after Erie, the substance-procedure
distinction was marked, in formalist fashion,107 by an a priori, or preexisting, line between two mutually exclusive concepts. Questions of
procedure in federal court were governed by federal, not state law.
Guaranty Trust replaced this rigid substance-procedure dichotomy with

103. Clark, supra note 80, at 270 (commenting on the “present marked shift towards emphasis
of state law in the federal courts. . . .”).
104. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4508 .
105. Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit
Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 80-81 (“Charles Clark
was perhaps the single most important figure in the drafting of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and one of the most active participants in the ultimately successful campaign for their
adoption. While dean of Yale Law School, Clark served as Reporter to the Advisory Committee
that drafted the 1938 Rules, and he wrote extensively and spoke frequently in support of them.
Although Clark's views were not held by all members of the Advisory Committee, his influence was
considerable.”).
106. Hon. Charles E. Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 1 F.R.D. 417, 419
(1940).
107. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 496-497 (1988)
(“[T]he classical theorists believed that these general principles contained legal concepts that could
be rigidly separated. Distinctions between concepts were analogized to boundary lines between two
pieces of property; either you are on my property or you are on your property—there is no gray
area. Either there is a contract with all its attendant legal obligations or there is no contract and
there are no affirmative obligations; either a state has personal jurisdiction or it does not; either you
have acted unreasonably or you have acted reasonably. Our current view of concepts as shading
into each other was almost completely absent in this period.”).
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a functional approach espoused by legal realists108 like Walter Wheeler
Cook in the domain of conflict of laws.109 This test looked to the effect
applying federal over state procedure would have on litigation
outcome.110
In place of the one-size-fits-all definitions of substance and
procedure, the Court recognized that their meaning varied according to
the legal context.111 Under this functional approach, the line between
substance and procedure is drawn “in different places, depending upon
the purpose for drawing it in any given instance.”112 In Guaranty Trust,
the plaintiff, whose state claim, brought as a federal diversity action,
would have been barred in state court by New York’s statute of
limitations, argued that her claim should be allowed to proceed under the
equitable doctrine of laches.113 A statute of limitations may be
characterized as “procedural” in the conflict-of-laws context—as noted
108. Id. at 474 (“The legal realists wanted to replace formalism with a pragmatic attitude
toward law generally. This attitude treats law as made, not found. Law therefore is, and must be,
based on human experience, policy, and ethics, rather than formal logic. Legal principles are not
inherent in some universal, timeless logical system; they are social constructs, designed by people in
specific historical and social contexts for specific purposes to achieve specific ends. Law and legal
reasoning are a part of the way we create our form of social life.”); Robert J. Condlin, “A
Formstone of Our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine & Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 475, 496 n.89 (“York, like Erie itself, is another offspring of legal realism and as such, part
of the general movement away from the formalism that represented American jurisprudence in the
first part of the twentieth century.”). But see Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 76, at 675 (disputing
the influence of legal realism on Erie).
109. Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE
L.J. 333, 343-344 (1933) (“If we admit that the ‘substantive’ shades off by imperceptible degrees
into the ‘procedural,’ and that the ‘line’ between them does not ‘exist,’ to be discovered merely by
logic and analysis, but is rather to be drawn so as best to carry out our purpose, we see that our
problem resolves itself substantially into this: How far can the court of the forum go in applying the
rules taken from the foreign system of law without unduly hindering or inconveniencing itself?”).
110. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4508 (“In place of the substance-procedure distinction,
York appeared to announce an outcome-determinative test for Erie questions, under which the
applicability of state law turned on whether ‘it significantly affect[s] the result of a litigation for a
federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim
by the same parties in a State court.’” (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109
(1945))).
111. Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 108 (“Matters of ‘substance’ and matters of ‘procedure’
are much talked about in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole
domain of law. But, of course, ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the same keywords to very different
problems. Neither ‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies
different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used.”).
112. Main, supra note 57, at 815 (“Beginning shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, the
early legal realist movement suggested that there was no pre-existing line [between substance and
procedure], but merely a decision that needed to be made about where the line would be drawn.
This realization, in turn, prompted acceptance of the notion that the line could be drawn in different
places, depending upon the purpose for drawing it in any given instance.”).
113. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 143 F.2d 503, 528 (2d. Cir. 1944).
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in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Shady Grove—but, under Guaranty
Trust, characterized as “substantive” in the Erie context because it
“would completely bar recovery in a suit if brought in a State court” and,
thus, “bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely formally or
negligibly.”114 Citing Guaranty Trust to support the dissent’s view in
Shady Grove that New York’s CPLR § 901(b) should be applied over
Federal Rule 23, Justice Ginsburg similarly noted that “state courts often
apply the forum’s limitations period as a ‘procedural’ bar to claims
arising under the law of another State.”115 Justice Frankfurter, writing
for the Court in Guaranty Trust, reformulated Erie in terms of outcome
difference: “The question is whether [New York’s statute of limitations]
. . . is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our
problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for
a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in
an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?”116
Under Guaranty Trust, the federal court sitting in diversity acts as a
surrogate for state court that “duplicate[s] state court results in diversity
cases.”117
The jurisprudential dichotomy between formalism and realism
reflected in Guaranty Trust’s reinterpretation of Erie is not a mere relic
of Erie’s past,118 for it reemerged in Shady Grove where the time-worn
“substance-procedure” battle was once again fought among Justices who
disagreed over the proper place to draw “the line” in determining the
validity under the REA of the federal class action rule as applied to
preempt New York’s limitation on maintaining class actions in an action
to recover statutory penalties.119 The bone of contention between Justice
114. Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 110.
115. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1471 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
116. Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 109.
117. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4504.
118. Realism is experiencing a resurgence. See, e.g., Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 59 (“Like
the old legal realists, new legal realists take aim at the “status quo bias” of formalist reasoning, a
bias once entrenched in Herbert Spencer’s ‘laissez-faire’ philosophy and its libertarian ideal and,
subsequently, Chicago-school neoclassical law and economics’ recast exposition of that same
ideal.”).
119. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (referring to rule validity under § 2072 of the REA:
“[T]he Rule must ‘really regulat[e] procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them, [citing Sibbach] . . . . The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s
substantive rights; most procedural rules do . . . . What matters is what the rule itself regulates: If it
governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the litigants’ rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if
it alters ‘the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not.”); id. at
1449-50 (“[I]n my view, the application of [the balance between federal and state interests] does not
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Scalia—a latter-day formalist120—and Justice Ginsburg—taking a realist
perspective121—was essentially whether Federal Rule 23 was valid as a
“procedural” rule, because it “really regulates procedure,”122 or invalid
because New York’s rule, though procedural on its face, was outcome
determinative in its real-world impact.123 Further, as discussed below,
Justice Ginsburg’s approach in Shady Grove to Federal Rule validity
essentially imports the RDA’s outcome determinative test into the
REA’s “substantive rights” proviso, which renders invalid federal rules
that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”124
By extending the reach of Erie’s command into the domain of
federal procedure by requiring federal courts to apply outcome
determinative state procedure, Guaranty Trust continued the shift in the
balance of judicial power, initiated by Erie, toward state governmental
interests, threatening to undermine the policy of federal procedural
uniformity only seven years after the Federal Rules took effect.

necessarily turn on whether the state law at issue takes the form of what is traditionally described as
substantive or procedural. Rather, it turns on whether the state law actually is part of a State’s
framework of substantive rights or remedies. . . . ‘The line between procedural and substantive law
is hazy,’ [citing Justice Reed’s concurrence in Erie] . . . and in some situations ‘procedure and
substance are so interwoven that rational separation becomes well-nigh impossible . . . . A ‘state
procedural rule, though undeniably ‘procedural’ in the ordinary sense of the term,’ may exist ‘to
influence substantive outcomes . . . and may in some instances become so bound up with the statecreated right or remedy that it defines the scope of that substantive right or remedy.”); id. at 1468
n.11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the “Court’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ reading of Rule 23 . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
120. See Scalia, supra note 64.
121. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1463 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Justice Stevens sees no
reason to read Rule 23 with restraint in this particular case; the Federal Rule preempts New York’s
damage limitation, in his view, because § 901(b) is ‘a procedural rule that is not part of New York’s
substantive law.’ . . . This characterization of § 901(b) does not mirror reality.” (emphasis added)).
122. Id. at 1442.
123. See id. at 1448 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)) (“The short of the matter is
that a Federal Rule governing procedure is valid whether or not it alters the outcome of the case in a
way that induces forum shopping. To hold otherwise would be to ‘disembowel either the
Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure’ or Congress’s exercise of it.”); id. at 1464
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s “mechanical reading of Federal Rules, insensitive
to state interests and productive of discord.”); id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Justice
Ginsburg’s approach would, in my view, work an end run around Congress’ system of uniform
federal rules.”).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
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Byrd Restores Equilibrium to Judicial Federalism: The “Erie”
Pendulum Swings Back toward Federal Procedural Uniformity as a
Counter-Weight to Outcome Determination

Applied literally, the outcome determination test threatened the
uniform application of the Federal Rules in federal diversity cases since
any procedural difference can affect the outcome of litigation.125 As
Professor John Hart Ely observed nine years after Hanna:
York’s outcome determination test seemed overbroad. As the Hanna
Court later noted, pushed to an extreme [the outcome determination
test] would imply that a litigant in a diversity action could insist on
filing his responsive pleadings in accord with the state rather than the
federal timetable, on the theory that enforcement of the federal
timetable would cause him to lose, and thereby undeniably determine
the outcome of the suit.126

From 1945 until 1958, the Court’s application of the outcome
determinative approach swung the Erie pendulum even further toward
deference to state law.127 The Court “seemed committed to applying this
outcome determinative test to its farthest reach”128 when it handed down
three decisions in 1949 applying state law over the Federal Rules.
Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper observed:
None of the opinions in Woods, Cohen, or Ragan mentioned the rules
Enabling Act or Sibbach. Without explaining why, the Court appeared
to have dismissed as irrelevant the objective, embodied in the Federal
Rules and endorsed by statute, of a uniform procedural system
applicable in all civil actions in the federal courts regardless of the
basis of subject-matter jurisdiction. In the wake of these three 1949
125. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4504; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 334 (5th ed. 2007) (referring to Cohen v. Beneficial Finance Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949), Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), and Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949): “After these decisions, there was great concern that the
outcome determinative test articulated in Guaranty Trust and applied in Cohen, Ragan, and Woods
ultimately would preclude the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in diversity cases because
the rules certainly can determine the outcome of litigation.”); Ely, supra note 50, at 724 n.170 (“[I]t
would seem that any rule can be said to have both ‘procedural effects,’ affecting the way in which
litigation is conducted, and ‘substantive effects,’ affecting society’s distribution of risks and
rewards. . . . Thus, an ‘effects test’ [to determine whether a Federal Rule abridges a state substantive
right] would seem destined either to unintelligibility or to the invalidation of every Federal Rule,
thereby rendering the Enabling Act entirely self-defeating.”).
126. Id. at 709.
127. Freer, supra note 11, at 1645 (“The outcome determination approach evolved in cases
decided between 1945 and 1958, a period marked by the Court’s bending over backward to find that
state law governed.”).
128. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4508.
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decisions many observers believed that there was no longer much, if
any, room for independent federal regulation of procedure.129

During this period, federal courts in diversity suits were viewed as
“clones” of the state courts,130 which concept, if carried to its logical
conclusion, would undermine the power of the federal judiciary, as an
independent judicial system, to regulate its own procedure. Elaborating
on this “clone theory,” Professor Freer has observed two ways in which
“RDA opinions during this time skewed Erie . . . .”:
First, the Court focused almost exclusively on the ‘litigant equality’
underpinning of Erie, downplaying the federalism basis of its holding.
Second, it converted the concern for litigant equality to a concern for
outcome equality. Erie had not expressed this concern. That case
aimed at ensuring that the substantive law be the same in federal and
state court; it did not mandate that federal courts act as replicas of the
state judiciary.131

Guaranty Trust threatened the integrity of the Federal Rules in yet
another way. As explained by Professor Ely, “[i]t was during the reign
of this outcome determination test that the Court made explicit the
magnitude of Erie’s influence, indicating that Erie is every bit as
relevant to the choice between state and federal law when there is a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure covering the point as when there is none
. . . .”132 The analysis for determining the validity of the Federal Rules
under the REA was thereby merged with—or linked to—the RDA
analysis under Erie for determining whether to apply state law or federal
common law procedure, with the latter informing the former. In 1965,
the Court in Hanna will break this link, declaring that, although both the
RDA, as interpreted in Guaranty Trust, and the REA require federal
courts to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law, the two

129. Id.
130. See Freer, supra note 11, at 1646 (“But a ‘clone theory’ took hold, identified largely with
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York[‘s outcome determination approach]. . . . Applying this approach
woodenly to matters seemingly procedural threatened the viability of the fledgling Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.”); Floyd, supra note 14, at 274 (stating that Guaranty Trust “threatened to replace
the separate federal system for administering justice with a clone of the state courts”); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945) (“But since a federal court adjudicating a Statecreated right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect,
only another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made unavailable
by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State.”).
131. Freer, supra note 11, at 1646 .
132. Ely, supra note 50, at 696.
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tests are different.133 Forty-five years after Hanna, the four dissenting
Justices in Shady Grove will attempt to re-establish this link between the
RDA’s outcome determinative test and the validity of the Federal Rules
under the REA’s “substantive rights” proviso, effectively swinging the
Erie pendulum back in the direction of state prerogatives134 at the
expense of federal procedural uniformity.
In reaction to the threat to “the integrity and independence of the
federal courts,”135 the Court, in its 1958 decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.,136 provided a mid-course correction137
between Guaranty Trust and Hanna. Byrd moderated the “extreme
interpretations of the York case that seemed to require federal courts in
the exercise of their diversity jurisdiction to transform themselves into
state courts”138 by recognizing the federal judiciary’s status as “an
independent system for administering justice.”139 Since Byrd, federal
courts sitting in diversity were no longer considered mere “clones” of
state courts.140 The second “correction” occurred seven years later when
the Court, responding to the continuing “threat to the goal of uniformity
of federal procedure,”141 held, in Hanna, that Erie is inapplicable
altogether to the validity of the Federal Rules.142
133. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (“It is true that both the Enabling Act and the
Erie rule say, roughly, that federal courts are to apply state ‘substantive’ law and federal
‘procedural’ law, but from that it need not follow that the tests are identical. For they were designed
to control very different sorts of decisions. When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules,
the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie Choice: the court
has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory
Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question
transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.” (emphasis
added)).
134. Ely, supra note 50, at 716 n.126 (“One of Hanna’s main points was that the Rules of
Decision Act is more protective of state prerogatives than the Enabling Act.”).
135. See Freer, supra note 11, at 1647.
136. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
137. See Floyd, supra note 14, at 275 (calling the Court’s opinion in Byrd “[t]he first of two
significant corrections” to Guaranty Trust).
138. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4504.
139. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
140. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448-49 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (“Congress has provided for a system of uniform federal rules . . . under which
federal courts sitting in diversity operate as ‘an independent system for administering justice to
litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction,’ [citing Byrd] and not as state-court clones that
assume all aspects of state tribunals but are managed by Article III judges [citing Hanna].”).
141. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463.
142. See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS
208 (5th ed. 2010) (“Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Hanna v. Plumer
marked the turning point in the expanding effect of the ‘outcome determinative’ test and placed
some practical limits on the Erie doctrine.”).
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Byrd restored some equilibrium to the federal-state judicial balance
by counterbalancing “outcome determination” with the interests of the
federal courts as an independent judicial system.143 The Court was
unclear, however, about what federal interests qualified to outweigh
application of the state rule.144 Although the particular issue in Byrd
concerned the judge-jury relationship, “the Supreme Court’s decision . . .
provided welcome support for applying the Civil Rules in the face of
conflicting state rules.”145
The Court’s balancing approach moderated the single-minded focus
on outcome determination by making it only one of three factors to
weigh in deciding whether to apply state law or federal procedure,
thereby “reinvigorat[ing] principles of federalism in the vertical choice
of law equation.”146 In formulating the balancing approach, the Court
also “divided the universe of state laws into the following three
categories: (1) rules defining state rights and obligations; (2) rules
‘bound up’ with state-created rights and obligations; and (3) rules of
‘form and mode.’”147 According to Byrd, Erie requires federal courts to
apply rules that define state rights and obligations—a classic definition
of substantive law.148 Read literally, the Court’s opinion appears also to
require the application of “bound up” rules.149 Rules of “form and
mode” are subject to Guaranty Trust’s outcome determination approach

143. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538.
144. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4504; Freer, supra note 11, at 1651 n.105 (“Byrd is
less than clear about what the federal interest is. Perhaps it is the influence of the Seventh
Amendment; perhaps it is the judge-jury relationship; perhaps it is in running an independent
system of justice.”).
145. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4508 (“Federal policies regarding how the federal courts
should be run—in Byrd, the federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions—must
be balanced against the policy of providing the same outcome in federal court as in state court.”);
Ely, supra note 50, at 696 (“In 1958, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., the
Court qualified [the outcome determination test] somewhat, announcing that Erie really required
that the state’s interests be balanced against whatever interests the federal government might have in
the application of its rule.”); Floyd, supra note 14, at 276-77 (“As Byrd has come generally to be
read, it mandates a federal court to balance the weight of the federal interest in the application of its
procedural rule against the weight of the interest in ‘furthering the objective that the litigation
should not come out one way in the federal court and another way in the state court.’” (citing Byrd,
356 U.S. at 538)).
146. Freer, supra note 50, at 1651.
147. TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 53, at 460.
148. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535 (“It was decided in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins that the federal courts
in diversity cases must respect the definition of state-created rights and obligations by the state
courts.”).
149. Id. at 535 (“We must, therefore, first examine the rule in Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co. to
determine whether it is bound up with these rights and obligations in such a way that its application
in the federal court is required.”).
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but counterbalanced by federal countervailing considerations.150 Under
a literal reading of Byrd, there is no balancing of rules that define state
rights and obligations or “bound up” state rules. However,
[o]ther courts and commentators have read the three sections of the
Byrd opinion to establish a three-factor balancing test, under which (1)
the significance or substantive character of the state rule under state
law and (2) the likelihood of different outcomes, are to be weighed
against (3) the importance of the federal interests or policies
underlying the competing federal rule.151

The distinction between procedural rules that are “bound up with
state created rights” and those characterized as “form and mode,” drawn
by the Court in Byrd in resolving Erie issues under the RDA, reappears
in Shady Grove but, this time, in the context of resolving the issue of
Federal Rule validity under the REA’s “substantive rights” proviso.152
After Gasperini, Professor Rowe, in “speaking of the limited
applicability of the Byrd balancing approach,” nevertheless anticipated
the continued relevance of the “bound up” character of a state rule—but
in the RDA-Erie context—when he suggested that:
Asking whether a state rule with a procedural cast is ‘intended to be
bound up with the definition of the rights and obligation of the parties’
. . . can be one sensible way of trying to figure out whether a state rule
also has enough of a substantive nature that it would threaten
‘inequitable administration of the laws.153

Twelve years later, in Shady Grove, Justice Stevens adopted a
somewhat similar approach in his pivotal concurring opinion—not to
figure out whether the New York state rule was substantive enough to
threaten one of the twin aims of Erie under the RDA—but, rather, to
determine whether state procedure was substantive enough to violate the
ban on abridging substantive rights under the REA’s “substantive rights”
proviso.154 As discussed in Part IV, Justice Stevens confined his
classification of state procedure as “substantive,” under the proviso, to
150. Id. at 537.
151. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4504.
152. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010).
153. Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 999 n.147.
154. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I readily acknowledge that if a
federal rule displaces a state rule that is ‘procedural’ in the ordinary sense of the term,’ . . . but
sufficiently interwoven with the scope of a substantive right or remedy, there would be an Enabling
Act problem, and the federal rule would have to give way.”); id. at 1458 (“[I]t is necessary to
distinguish between procedural rules adopted for some policy reason and seemingly procedural rules
that are intimately bound up in the scope of a substantive right or remedy.”).
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“bound up” rules, excluding merely outcome determinative state
procedure.155 Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, in realist fashion,
would expand the meaning of “substantive rights” under the REA to
include outcome determinative state procedure, whether or not “bound
up”156 with state-created rights. Only the four dissenting Justices in
Shady Grove adopted Justice Ginsburg’s broad, outcome-determinative
interpretation of “substantive” under the REA while Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court’s plurality, essentially dismissed the proviso as
redundant.
D.

Hanna—The Judicial Balance Continues to Shift toward Federal
Rules Uniformity: RDA-Erie No Longer Applies to Test the
Validity and, Hence, Applicability of a Federal Rule

In 1965, the pendulum continued its momentum toward the federal
interest in procedural uniformity, a policy mandated by Congress under
158
the REA.157 In Hanna v. Plumer,
Chief Justice Warren, in a strong
endorsement of the breadth of the federal rulemaking power,159 wrote for
the Court:
One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about
uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This
is especially true of matters which relate to the administration of legal
proceedings, an area in which federal courts have traditionally exerted
strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers Congress
expressly conferred in the Rules.160

155. Id. at 1458 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Although almost every rule is adopted for some
reason and has some effect on the outcome of litigation, not every state rule ‘defines the dimensions
of [a] claim itself . . . .’”).
156. Id. at 1469 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (applying Hanna’s “twin aims” Erie test “inquiring
‘whether application of the [state] rule would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one
or both of the litigants that failure to [apply] it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose federal
court”).
157. Ely, supra note 50, at 696 (“The Court [after Byrd] could not leave such sensible
moderation alone, however, and in 1965, the pendulum that had begun in Byrd to swing back
toward the teaching of Erie swung too far, indeed perhaps beyond its 1938 starting place, in Chief
Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court in Hanna v. Plumer.”).
158. 380 U. S. 460 (1965).
159. PURCELL, JR., supra note 55, at 288 (“The Hanna decision was typical of the Warren
Court. Ensuring the uniformity of federal procedure and guaranteeing its independence from the
states, the decision asserted federal authority broadly and exemplified the Court’s nationalizing
tendencies.”).
160. Hanna, 380 U. S. at 472-73 (quoting Lumbermen’s Mutual Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d
759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963).
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Hanna addressed the issue whether substitute service of process
upon an executor pursuant to Federal Rule 4(d)(1) was proper in light of
a state rule that required in-hand delivery upon the executor.161 The
Court bifurcated the “Erie” analysis into two separate tracks, announcing
two different tests for applying the “substance-procedure” distinction
depending on whether a Federal Rule addressed the issue in dispute or
not. Put simply, if there is a Federal Rule on point, and that Rule is
constitutional and a valid exercise of authority delegated by Congress
under the REA, the Rule prevails over conflicting state law, even
outcome determinative state procedure.162 The Court made clear that the
application of the outcome determination analysis under the RDA is
confined to “those genuine Erie cases in which the choice-of-law
question does not involve a federal rule”163—the “unguided Erie
choice.”164 In other words, the Erie analysis under the RDA does not
apply where a Federal Rule governs the issue in dispute. The Court
concluded: “To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease
to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights
would be to disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over
federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in the
Enabling Act.”165
Forty-five years later, in Shady Grove, Justice Stevens’s
concurrence will cite this central feature of Hanna in response to Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent, which appeared to blur the line between RDA and
REA analyses:
The dissent would apply the Rules of Decision Act inquiry under Erie
even to cases in which there is a governing federal rule, and thus the
Act, by its own terms, does not apply. But ‘[w]hen a situation is

161. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461.
162. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4504; id. § 4509 (“The central point of the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Hanna v. Plumer is that the terms of the Rules Enabling Act and relevant
constitutional restrictions, rather than the principle of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, govern
the validity and applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the federal courts, even in
cases arising under their diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.”).
163. Id. § 4504.
164. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (“When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the
question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice.”).
165. Id. at 473-74; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 125, at 329 (“Accordingly, it is now clearly
established that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
are to be applied by the federal court, even if there is a conflicting state requirement and even if the
application of the federal Rule might determine the outcome of the case. The key decision
establishing this proposition is Hanna v. Plumer.”).
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covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a
far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice.’166

He went on to echo Hanna’s conclusion regarding federal rules
uniformity: “Although it reflects a laudable concern to protect ‘state
regulatory policies,’ . . . Justice Ginsburg’s approach would, in my view,
work an end run around Congress’ system of uniform federal rules . . .
and our decision in Hanna.”167
Although the Court in Hanna ruled that the validity of a Federal
Rule should be determined solely under the REA, not the RDA, the
Court gave scant attention to the extent to which the REA limits the
validity of the Federal Rules. Section 2072(a) authorizes the Court to
prescribe rules “of practice and procedure.”168 However, § 2072(b)
provides, in the so-called “substantive rights” proviso, that such rules
may not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”169 Under a
literal reading of the REA, a Rule could be “procedural” within the
meaning of § 2072(a), yet abridge a substantive state right and, thus, be
invalid under the “substantive rights” proviso. However, in its 1941
opinion in Sibbach v. Wilson, the Court rejected this literal reading in
favor of a test of rule validity that turns solely on “whether a rule really
regulates procedure,” defining “procedure” as “the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”170
As Professor Ely explained:
[T]he possibility that a Rule could fairly be labeled procedural and at
the same time abridge or modify substantive rights was one the Court
was unwilling to accept; by its lights, either a Rule was procedural or it
affected substantive rights. Thus, the Act’s two questions were

166. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1456-57 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471).
167. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
170. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 53, at 480
(“[T]he real problem with the Court’s interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act in Sibbach and later
cases is that it recognizes virtually no restrictions on the rulemaking authority at all.”). But see
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court [in Sibbach] had no
occasion to consider whether the particular application of the Federal Rules in question would
offend the Enabling Act. . . .The matter at issue [requiring medical exams for litigants] did not
pertain to ‘substantive rights’ under the Enabling Act.”). The Sibbach Court rejected plaintiff’s
expansive definition of “substantive rights” to encompass “important and substantial rights
theretofore recognized.” Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13. The Sibbach Court further noted that the
applicable law of Indiana, the place of plaintiff’s injury, did not bar orders compelling medical
exams. Id.
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collapsed into one: ‘The test must be whether a rule really regulates
procedure . . . .’171

The Hanna Court approved Sibbach’s “really regulates procedure”
test of the validity and, therefore, applicability, of the Federal Rules,
simply quoting the test verbatim without elaboration.172 In Gasperini the
Court made only passing reference to the “substantive rights” proviso in
a footnote, intimating—in response to Justice Scalia’s dissent—that Rule
59 might be invalid if it preempted New York’s verdict-excessiveness
standard.173 But, as discussed in Part IV, the issue of the scope of §
2072(b) reappears in Shady Grove where, for the first time since Hanna,
the Justices debate the relevance of the “substantive rights” proviso as an
independent limitation on rule validity under Sibbach.174 Justice Stevens
and the dissent will square off with the plurality, led by Justice Scalia,
on the meaning of Sibbach.
Justice Harlan, in his concurrence in Hanna, criticized the Court’s
presumption in favor of Rule validity at the expense of state substantive
interests, believing that the pendulum had swung too far by removing the
Erie inquiry from the Federal Rules:
So long as a reasonable man could characterize any duly adopted
federal rule as “procedural,” the Court, unless I misapprehend what is
said, would have it apply no matter how seriously it frustrated a State’s
substantive regulation of the primary conduct and affairs of its citizens.
Since the members of the Advisory Committee, the Judicial
Conference, and this Court who formulated the Federal Rules are
presumably reasonable men, it follows that the integrity of the Federal
Rules is absolute. Whereas the unadulterated outcome and forumshopping tests may err too far toward honoring state rules, I submit
that the Court's “arguably procedural, ergo constitutional” test moves
too fast and far in the other direction.175

171. Ely, supra note 50, at 719.
172. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464. Between Hanna and Gasperini, the Court made passing
reference to the “substantive rights” proviso as an additional requirement for Rule validity. See
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991) (“The [Rules
Enabling] Act authorizes the Court ‘to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure,’ but
provides that such rules ‘shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.’”); Burlington
N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (“The Rules Enabling Act, however, contains an
additional requirement. The Federal Rules must not ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right . . . .’”).
173. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 438 n.22 (1996).
174. See infra Part IV.
175. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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In Shady Grove, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent will draw upon Justice
Harlan’s concurrence in Hanna, reprising his invocation of Erie—“one
of the modern cornerstones of our federalism”176—to set the stage for
her view that the Federal Rules should continue to be interpreted “with
an awareness of, and sensitivity to, important state regulatory
policies.”177
When no Federal Rule is on point, so that the court is faced with an
“unguided Erie choice” under the RDA, Hanna, in dicta, reverted to the
outcome determination approach rather than Byrd.178 But the Court
moderated outcome determination’s extreme application by linking it to
Erie’s “twin policies” of forum shopping and inequitable administration
of the laws:179
Erie and its progeny make clear that when a federal court sitting in a
diversity case is faced with a question of whether or not to apply state
law, the importance of a state rule is indeed relevant, but only in the
context of asking whether application of the rule would make so
important a difference to the character or result of the litigation that
failure to enforce it would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the
forum State, or whether application of the rule would have so
important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that
failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the
federal court.180

Fast-forward again to Shady Grove, where Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent cited the italicized words in the above-quoted portion of the
Court’s opinion in Hanna to focus on the practical reality that Shady
Grove sued Allstate in federal court to “seek class relief that is ten
thousand times greater than the individual remedy available to it in state
court.”181

176. Id. at 474.
177. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1460 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
178. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466-67.
179. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (“A later pathmarking case,
qualifying Guaranty Trust, explained that the ‘outcome-determination’ test must not be applied
mechanically to sweep in all manner of variations; instead, its application must be guided by ‘the
twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws.’” (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. 474)).
180. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9 (emphasis added).
181. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1469 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis original).
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Between Hanna and Gasperini: When Federal Rules and State Law
Collide
1. Hanna’s Bifurcated “Erie” Analysis

From Hanna (1965) to Shady Grove (2010), the Court has adhered
to its distinction between an “unguided Erie Choice,” resolved under the
RDA, and the applicability and validity of a Federal Rule over state law,
which is determined under the REA.182 A possible exception is the
Court’s decision in Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp.183 (2001), which narrowly construed Federal Rule 41(b), holding
that it did not govern the issue whether a federal court’s dismissal of a
breach of contract and tort action as time-barred under California’s twoyear statute of limitations precluded a subsequent action in a Maryland
state court on the same claims which were not time-barred under that
state’s three-year statute of limitations. Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia asserted that a broad interpretation of Rule 41(b) that would
extinguish Semtek’s right under California law to sue on its claims in
Maryland even after the California statute of limitations expired “would
seem to violate” the REA’s “substantive rights” proviso and, thus,
constitute an invalid application of Rule 41(b).184 However, Justice
Scalia then went on to apply an RDA “outcome determination” analysis,
stating that a broad construction of the Rule to govern the claim
preclusive effect in other courts of a dismissal of a state claim would
“violate the federalism principle of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . by
engendering ‘“substantial” variations [in outcomes] between state and
federal litigation’ which would ‘[l]ikely . . . influence the choice of a
forum . . . .’”185 (Ironically, these words will be quoted in Shady Grove
by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent to Justice Scalia’s Opinion of the
Court.)186
But nine years later, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Shady
Grove, in a seemingly inconsistent statement, reaffirmed that “a Federal
182. Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 975 (“Since Hanna it has been clear that the validity of a
candidate Federal Rule that covers the point at issue is to be judged by reference to the charter for
the Federal Rules, the Rules Enabling Act.”); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4508; Burlington N.
R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (“The cardinal purpose of Congress in authorizing the
development of a uniform and consistent system of rules governing federal practice and procedure
suggests that rules which incidentally affect litigants’ substantive rights do not violate this provision
if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules.”).
183. 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
184. Id. at 503-04.
185. Id. at 504.
186. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss4/4

32

Koppel: The Fruits of Shady Grove

9-KOPPEL_44.4_8.7.11_DONE-9.2.11.DOCM

2011]

THE FRUITS OF SHADY GROVE

9/12/2011 1:09 PM

1031

rule that fails Erie’s forum-shopping test is not ipso facto invalid,” citing
Hanna.187 The apparent inconsistency between these two statements
may be reconciled by his caveat, in a footnote in Shady Grove, that
Federal Rules should be read to avoid substantial differences in outcome
only when the Rule is ambiguous—as it was in Semtek, but not in Shady
Grove—and then, not to avoid an invalid application of the Rule under
the “substantive rights” proviso of the REA, but “because it is
reasonable to assume that ‘Congress is just as concerned as we have
been to avoid significant differences between state and federal courts in
adjudicating claims.’”188
2. The Conflict between Federal Rules and State Law
Further, in all its decisions since Hanna—with Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp.189 (1980), Gasperini v. Center for Humanities190 (1996), and
Semtek v. International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.191 (2001) as the
exceptions—the Court has not been inclined to narrowly construe the
scope of a federal statute or Federal Rule to avoid colliding with, and
thus preempting, state law.192
Although Walker narrowly interpreted the candidate Federal Rule,
the Court rejected the idea that the Federal Rules should be narrowly
interpreted to avoid a direct collision with state law but, rather, said that
they are to be given their “plain meaning.”193 (Thirty years later, in her
dissent in Shady Grove, Justice Ginsburg would cite Walker194 to support
her argument that Federal Rule 23 should be narrowly interpreted to
avoid a collision with New York’s class action rule, asking: “Is this
conflict really necessary?”)195 In Walker,196 the Court held that Federal

187. Id. at 1441 n.7.
188. Id. (citing Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37-38 (1988)).
189. 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980).
190. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). See Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 995 (noting that “[t]he Gasperini
Court’s shift of emphasis . . . should not be overread because the majority did not disavow the
earlier statements about ‘plain meaning’ and straightforward . . . statutory interpretation’ . . . .”).
191. 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
192. Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 968 (“[[T]he Court’s] attitude at least until Gasperini appeared
to involve not going out of the way to avoid a conflict. . . . Indeed, the Court in all its other major
Erie-Hanna decisions since 1965 involving federal statutes and rules had found the ‘direct collision’
that triggers the Hanna analysis.”).
193. 446 U.S. at 750 n.9 (“This is not to suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a ‘direct collision’ with state law. The Federal Rules
should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision with state law arises from that plain
meaning, then the analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.”).
194. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1462-63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
195. Id. at 1460.
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Rule 3, which defines “commencement” of an action to mean filing the
complaint, did not conflict with Oklahoma’s statute of limitations, which
provided an action commences with service of summons, finding that
“Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing requirements of the
Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect state statutes of
limitations.”197
In deciding that Walker was indistinguishable from its pre-Hanna
holding in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., where the
Court narrowly construed Rule 3 to avoid colliding with a similar state
“commencement” rule,198 the Court emphasized the force of stare decisis
in reaffirming Ragan:
We note at the outset that the doctrine of stare decisis weighs heavily
against petitioner in this case. Petitioner seeks to have us overrule our
decision in Ragan. Stare decisis does not mandate that earlier
decisions be enshrined forever, of course, but it does counsel that we
use caution in rejecting established law. In this case, the reasons
petitioner asserts for overruling Ragan are the same factors which we
concluded in Hanna did not undermine the validity of Ragan. A
litigant who in effect asks us to reconsider not one but two prior
decisions bears a heavy burden of supporting such a change in our
jurisprudence. Petitioner here has not met that burden.199

Both Ragan and Walker also presented compelling cases for
avoiding a conflict because the state tolling statute was integrally
linked200 to the enforcement of the substantive201 purposes of the state’s
statute of limitations: “In contrast to Rule 3, the Oklahoma statute is a
statement of a substantive decision by that State that actual service on,
and accordingly actual notice by, the defendant is an integral part of the
several policies served by the statute of limitations.”202 As discussed
196. 446 U.S. 740.
197. Id. at 751.
198. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
199. Walker, 446 U.S. at 749.
200. Id. at 743 n.4 (quoting OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, §97 (1971) (repealed by Laws 1984, c. 164, §
32, eff. Nov. 1, 1984) (“An action shall be deemed commenced, within the meaning of this article
[the statute of limitations], as to each defendant, at the date of the summons which is served on him
. . . .” (emphasis added)).
201. Walker, 446 U.S. at 751-52.
202. Id. at 751 n.13 (“The substantive link of § 97 to the statute of limitations is made clear as
well by another provision of Oklahoma law. Under Okla. Stat., tit. 12, § 151 (1971), ‘[a] civil
action is deemed commenced by filing in the office of the court clerk of the proper court a petition
and by the clerk’s issuance of summons thereon.’ This is the state-law corollary to Rule 3.
However, § 97, not § 151, controls the commencement of the lawsuit for statute of limitations
purposes. See Tyler v. Taylor, 578 P. 2d 1214 (Okla. App. 1977). Just as § 97 and § 151 can both
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more fully in Part IV and as previously noted in connection with Byrd,
Justice Stevens—whose concurring opinion in Shady Grove was pivotal
to the majority result in that case in which Federal Rule 23 trumped New
York’s more limited class action rule—emphasized the difference
between a state rule that merely affects the outcome of the litigation—
Justice Ginsburg’s touchstone, which Justice Stevens rejected—and a
state rule that is “intimately bound up in the scope of a substantive right
or remedy.”203 In his view, narrowly interpreting a Federal Rule to
avoid a collision with state law is only justified where the state law is
integrally bound up with the definition of the substantive right.204
Like Ragan and Walker, Semtek presented the other compelling
post-Hanna case for avoiding a conflict to steer clear of violating the
REA’s “substantive rights” proviso. All three cases involved state law
that was integrally connected to the enforcement of the state’s statute of
limitations; in Walker and Ragan, the state law marked the date of
commencement of an action for purposes of tolling the statute;205 in
Semtek, the state law governed the claim preclusion effect of the
dismissal of an action, commenced after the statute’s expiration, on the
right to commence a subsequent action in a state with a longer statutory
period.206 In Justice Scalia’s words: “[I]f California law left petitioner
free to sue on this claim in Maryland even after the California statute of
limitations had expired, the federal court’s extinguishment of that right
(through Rule 41(b)’s mandated claim-preclusive effect of its judgment)
would seem to violate this limitation.”207 In Shady Grove, Justice
Stevens will cite Justice Scalia’s narrow interpretation of Rule 41(b) in
Semtek to support his contention that the “substantive rights” proviso
functions as an additional constraint on Federal Rule validity and that
“[w]hen a federal rule appears to abridge, enlarge, or modify a
substantive right, federal courts must consider whether the rule can
reasonably be interpreted to avoid that impermissible result.”208
In the two other post-Hanna decisions, until Gasperini, the Court
found that the Federal Rule or statute at issue directly collided with, and

apply in state court for their separate purposes, so too § 97 and Rule 3 may both apply in federal
court in a diversity action.” (emphasis added)).
203. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1458 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
204. Id.
205. Ragan v. Merch. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 377 U.S. 530, 533 (1949); Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1980).
206. Semtek Int’l v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 (2001).
207. Id. at 503-04.
208. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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trumped, the state rule.209 In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v.
Woods,210 the Court found that a state rule of appellate procedure that
imposed a mandatory affirmance penalty on an unsuccessful appellant
conflicted with Federal Appellate Rule 38’s “case-by-case approach to
identifying and deterring frivolous appeals.”211 The Court declined to
narrowly interpret Rule 38 to accommodate the state’s interest, finding
that “the Alabama statute precludes any exercise of discretion within its
scope of operation.”212 Woods reaffirmed Hanna’s support of federal
procedural uniformity at the expense of outcome difference: “The
cardinal purpose of Congress in authorizing the development of a
uniform and consistent system of rules governing federal practice and
procedure suggests that Rules which incidentally affect litigants’
substantive rights do not violate this provision if reasonably necessary to
maintain the integrity of that system of rules.”213
One year later, in Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp.,214 the
Court, again citing Hanna, and over Scalia’s lone dissent, broadly
construed 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to preempt application by the federal
court of Alabama’s state contract law that barred enforcement of forum
selection clauses. As in Burlington Northern, the Court concluded that
the state rule conflicted with the broad discretion conferred by § 1404(a)
on the federal court to weigh a variety of factors bearing upon interdistrict transfer of cases.215 Justice Scalia dissented in Ricoh, differing
with the majority’s broad reading of § 1404(a).216 In an ironic reversal
of positions in Shady Grove, in which Justice Scalia refused to narrowly
construe Federal Rule 23 to avoid a collision with New York’s class
action rule, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Shady Grove will quote Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Stewart Organization:217 “[I]n deciding whether a
federal . . . Rule of Procedure encompasses a particular issue, a broad

209. Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 968 (“[I]n all its other major Erie-Hanna decisions since 1965
involving federal statutes and rules [the Court] had found the ‘direct collision’ that triggers the
Hanna analysis.”).
210. 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
211. Id. at 8.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 5.
214. 487 U.S. 22 (1988)
215. Id. at 32.
216. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1461 (2010)
(quoting Justice Scalia in Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37-38 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
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reading that would create significant disuniformity between state and
federal courts should be avoided if the text permits.”218
F.

Gasperini: The Pendulum Swings Back Again toward Interpreting
Federal Rules Narrowly to Accommodate Substantive State
Interests

Hanna left unresolved some basic Erie issues. The Court’s cursory
affirmance of Sibbach’s single-test of rule validity under the REA was
criticized for “fail[ing] to provide a workable judicial line of
demarcation between the overlapping and often conflicting spheres of
power of the federal and state governments.”219 Also, Hanna—which, in
dicta, asserted that a modified version of the outcome determinative test
should be applied, in light of the “twin aims of Erie,” to resolve RDAErie issues—did not clarify the fate of Byrd.220 As Professor Freer
noted, because Hanna neither overruled nor discussed Byrd, “[o]bservers
looked to Gasperini with hope, because the case involved the allocation
of authority between judge and jury, just as Byrd had.”221
In Gasperini, the plaintiff won a $450,000 jury verdict in a
diversity suit.222 The defendant moved for a new trial under Federal
Rule 59 on the grounds that the damage award was excessive.223 Rule
59(a)(1) provides that “[t]he Court may . . . grant a new trial . . . for any
reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at
law in federal court.”224 Traditionally, one of those reasons is verdictexcessiveness, but Rule 59 does not specify the applicable standard for
determining whether the jury’s damage award is excessive. In
scrutinizing jury awards, federal trial judges have ordered new trials on

218. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219. Comment: Hanna v. Plumer: An Expanded Concept of Federal Common Law—A
Requiem for Erie?, 1966 DUKE L.J. 142, 165 (1966) (predicting that “future friction and consequent
reformulation appear inevitable, especially in view of the failure of the Court to delineate with
precision the outlines of the reformulated Erie test and the requisite constitutional shackles which
confine the tentacles of federal interest”).
220. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
221. Freer, supra note 11, at 1654; id. at 1650-51 (“Byrd has the wonderful virtue of placing
outcome determination in a larger context . . . . Byrd gives a sophisticated model. . . . It corrects the
fixation on outcome determination by making it one factor (not the sole factor) in the RDA analysis.
. . . [B]y embracing the concept of balancing, the Court reinvigorated principles of federalism in the
vertical choice of law equation. Unfortunately, the Court let Byrd languish, leading to confusion in
the lower courts over how to apply it. The Court compounded the confusion by failing to discuss
Byrd as part of the RDA equation in its next great pronouncement, Hanna.”).
222. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 420 (1996).
223. Id.
224. FED. R. CIV. P. 59.
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grounds of excessive damages only when the verdict is so unreasonable
that it “shocks the conscience.”225 Federal appellate courts only review
new trial orders for abuse of discretion.226
In 1986, the New York Legislature enacted CPLR § 5501(c), a tortreform measure designed to rein in runaway jury awards by giving the
state’s appellate courts authority to review jury awards for excessiveness
and to order a new trial if an award “deviates materially from what
would be reasonable compensation.”227 The “‘deviates materially’
standard calls for closer surveillance than ‘shock the conscience’
oversight.”228 The federal district judge in Gasperini denied the
defendant’s new trial motion.229 On appeal, the Court of Appeal,
applying CPLR § 5501(c), held that the $450,000 verdict “materially
deviate[d] from what is reasonable compensation” and ordered a new
trial unless the plaintiff agreed to an award of $100,000. On appeal to
the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, framed the
Erie-Hanna issue: “This case presents an important question regarding
the standard a federal court uses to measure the alleged excessiveness of
a jury's verdict in an action for damages based on state law.”230
1. Did Federal Rule 59 and New York’s CPLR § 5501(c) Collide?
Under Hanna’s analytical approach, a court must first “decide
initially whether the rule actually conflicts with state law or whether it is
narrower in scope so that the applicability of the state rule is governed
by Erie.”231 And, as already noted, all post-Hanna decisions, except
Walker and Semtek, declined to narrowly interpret the scope of a Federal
Rule to avoid colliding with state law.232 The Court’s majority in
Gasperini veered from this line of decisions suggesting, in Professor
Rowe’s words, “somewhat more deferential interpretations of federal

225. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 422 (“Before 1986, state and federal courts in New York generally
invoked the same judge-made formulation in responding to excessiveness attacks on jury verdicts:
courts would not disturb an award unless the amount was so exorbitant that it ‘shocked the
conscience of the court.’”); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4511.
226. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 422-23.
227. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (emphasis added).
228. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 424.
229. Id. at 420.
230. Id. at 422.
231. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4508.
232. See supra Part III.E.2.
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law to avoid federal-state conflicts.”233 Justice Ginsburg gave scant
attention in Gasperini to whether Rule 59 controlled the standard for
determining excessiveness, addressing the issue indirectly in a footnote
directed at Justice Scalia’s dissent.234 Instead, the Court’s opinion
initially framed the choice of law issue in terms evocative of Byrd—
“whether federal courts can give effect to the substantive thrust of §
5501(c) without untoward alteration of the federal scheme for the trial
and decision of civil cases”235—and then proceeded to launch into an
Erie-RDA analysis to determine whether CPLR § 5501(c) is outcome
determinative under Hanna’s “twin aims” dicta. The Court held that
“New York’s check on excessive damages implicates what we have
called Erie’s ‘twin aims’”236 and, therefore, provided the applicable
standard of excessiveness. Quoting Ragan, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that, “[j]ust as the Erie principle precludes a federal court from giving a
state-created claim ‘longer life . . . than [the claim] would have had in
the state court,’ . . . so Erie precludes a recovery in federal court
significantly larger than the recovery that would have been tolerated in
state court.”237
In her dissenting opinion in Shady Grove, Justice Ginsburg will
unsuccessfully make a similar argument that Erie should preclude Shady
Grove from maintaining a class action under Rule 23 “to transform a
$500 case into a $5,000,000 award [when] the State creating the right to
recover has proscribed this alchemy” by barring a class action on the
same state-created right in state court.238 And although, in Gasperini,
Justice Stevens agreed with her Erie analysis,239 in Shady Grove he will

233. Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 994; Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428 n.7 (quoting Walker, the
Court’s opinion noted that “[f]ederal courts have interpreted the Federal Rules, however, with
sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies”).
234. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 438 n.22 (“Justice Scalia finds in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59 a ‘federal standard’ for new trial motions in ‘“direct collision”’ with, and ‘“leaving no room for
the operation of,”’ a state law like CPLR § 5501(c). The relevant prescription, Rule 59(a), has
remained unchanged since the adoption of the Federal Rules by this Court in 1937. Rule 59(a) is as
encompassing as it is uncontroversial. It is indeed ‘Hornbook’ law that a most usual ground for a
Rule 59 motion is that ‘the damages are excessive.’ Whether damages are excessive for the claimin-suit must be governed by some law. And there is no candidate for that governance other than the
law that gives rise to the claim for relief—here, the law of New York.” (internal citations omitted)).
235. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426.
236. Id. at 430.
237. Id.
238. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1460 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
239. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 440 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court correctly explains why
the 1986 enactment of § 5501(c) of the N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law and Rules (McKinney 1995) changed
the substantive law of the State. A state-law ceiling on allowable damages, whether fixed by a
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reject her dissenting opinion’s use of the outcome determinative test to
support a narrow interpretation of Rule 23 to avoid violating the REA’s
“substantive rights” proviso.240
Some have speculated about what Gasperini portends for the “plain
meaning” approach to interpreting the Federal Rules advanced in
Walker241 and, more fundamentally, for the policy of robust enforcement
of the REA’s policy of federal procedural uniformity articulated in
Burlington Northern.242 After Gasperini, Professor Freer observed that
“the Court appears to embrace a new general policy regarding
interpretation of Federal Rules,”243 suggesting that, “if the Court means
what it says, it may have replaced the search for ‘plain meaning’ with a
heightened sensitivity to potential impact on state policy.”244
Gasperini’s narrow interpretation of Rule 59 raised questions about
the future of federal rules uniformity under the REA. A Cornell Law
Review student note published after the Court’s decision suggested that
“[i]f the majority really construed Rule 59 as allowing for a state-law
gap-filler because the Rule did not explicitly set the standard of review,
then many other Federal Rules will be subject to similar preemption,”
which “would undermine much of the predictability the Hanna holding
provides” and reduce the Federal Rules, when not explicit, to the status
of “mere empty containers waiting to be filled by state procedural
rules.”245 Along these lines, Professor Adam Steinman recently invoked
Gasperini to support his contention that Erie now requires federal courts
to apply state case law interpretations of Federal Rules to avoid outcome
differences.246
Professor Rowe counseled caution in prophesying such extreme
interpretations of Gasperini, suggesting that “the Gasperini Court’s shift
of emphasis . . . should not be overread because the majority did not
disavow the earlier statements about ‘plain meaning’ and

dollar limit or by a standard that forbids any award that ‘deviates materially from what would be
reasonable compensation’ is a substantive rule of decision that federal courts must apply in diversity
cases governed by New York law.” (internal citations omitted)).
240. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring).
241. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980) (“The Federal Rules should
be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision with state law arises from that plain meaning, then
the analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.”).
242. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1987).
243. Freer, supra note 11, at 1642.
244. Id. at 1643.
245. J. Benjamin King, Note, Clarification and Disruption: The Effect of Gasperini v. Center
for Humanities, Inc., on the Erie Doctrine, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 189 (1997).
246. Steinman, supra note 23, at 282-87.
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‘straightforward . . . statutory interpretation.”247 While cautioning that
“confident prophecy would be rash,” he expressed doubt that federal
courts would broadly interpret Gasperini to reduce the Federal Rules to
mere receptacles for state law, “[g]iven the generality of Rule 59’s
language, the specificity of the Gasperini majority’s focus on what it
regarded as the substantive nature of the New York ‘deviates
materiality’ standard, and the lower federal courts’ treatment of
Gasperini thus far.”248 As explained in Part IV, Professor Rowe’s
prediction that Gasperini did not portend an abandonment of the plain
meaning interpretation of Federal Rules seems justified by Shady Grove,
where the Court’s majority will return to post-Hanna precedent by
declining to avoid a conflict between Federal Rule 23 and New York’s
class action rule.249
2. If Federal Rule 59 had Conflicted with CPLR § 5501(c), Would
It Have Been “Invalid” (as Applied) Under the REA?
Under Hanna, if the court finds a conflict between the Federal Rule
and state law because the Rule is broad enough to address the issue in
dispute, the court must then determine whether the Rule is valid under
the REA.250 Interpreting the REA’s limitations on Rule validity raises
two basic issues: (1) Does § 2072(b)—the “substantive rights”
proviso—function as an additional limit on the Court’s rulemaking
authority; and (2) if it does, what is a “substantive right”? If the state
law does not conflict with a Federal Rule, the court engages in an Erie
analysis, applying the modified outcome determinative test.
First, if the candidate Rule qualifies as a rule of “practice and
procedure” under § 2072(a)—if it “really regulates procedure” under
Sibbach—can it, nevertheless, be invalid on its face, or as applied,
because it would “abridge, modify or enlarge substantive rights” under §
2072(b)? In other words, does the “substantive rights” proviso act as an
independent constraint on rule validity?251 Before Gasperini, Professors
Wright, Miller, and Cooper predicted:

247. Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 995.
248. Id. at 995 n.126.
249. See infra Part IV.
250. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4508.
251. Professor Burbank’s research into the legislative history of the Enabling Act revealed that
“the Supreme Court was correct in Sibbach and subsequent cases to the extent that it failed to
attribute independent meaning to the Act’s second sentence, and thus to impute to the second
sentence limitations not imposed by the first.” Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of
1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1107-08 (1982) (“In the opinion of the draftsman, as indicated in his
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[T]here is reason to believe that the Supreme Court, should it have
occasion to address specifically the relationship between the
constitutional and the statutory restrictions on the permissible scope of
the Civil Rules, will disapprove the suggestion in Hanna that the
Sibbach test is the appropriate standard for determining both the
constitutionality of a Civil Rule and its validity under the Enabling
Act.252

This prediction did not materialize in Gasperini, where the majority
glossed over the REA issue of the validity of Rule 59 as applied to
trump New York’s “materially deviates” rule. As noted previously, the
Court did not directly address whether Rule 59 controls the standard for
determining excessive damage awards, responding only indirectly to
Justice Scalia’s dissent on this point.253 Professor Rowe opined that
Justice Ginsburg’s response to Justice Scalia’s “broad reading of Rule
59”—which included a brief reference to § 2072(b)’s “ban on affecting
substantive rights”—provides a clue that the Court may be suggesting
that a broad application of Rule 59 to trump the state standard for
determining excessiveness might be invalid under the REA.254 Professor
Rowe acknowledged that this reference “reads much like the passing
acknowledgments of the substantive-rights proviso seen in previous
opinions, but the Court’s use of § 2072(b) gives some tentative support
to the view that it might be willing in an appropriate, albeit unusual, case
to read real teeth into that part of the statute.”255 As discussed more fully
in Part IV, this prophecy seems to have partly come true in Shady
Grove.256 Although the plurality, led by Justice Scalia, reaffirmed the
Sibbach test, which collapsed the two REA provisions into a single
“really regulates procedure” standard,257 a five Justice majority—
Stevens concurrence and the four dissenting Justices— did, in fact, “read
teeth” into § 2072(b).258

correspondence, the second sentence served only to emphasize a restriction inherent in the use of
the word ‘procedure’ in the first sentence.”).
252. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4508.
253. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 n.22 (1996).
254. Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 996 (“As part of its response to Justice Scalia’s broad reading
of Rule 59, the majority briefly mentioned § 2072(b)’s ban on affecting substantive rights. In
context, the Court seemed to be hinting that construing Rule 59 in such a way as to trump the state
verdict-excessiveness standard just might raise a problem under the REA.”).
255. Id.
256. See infra Part IV.
257. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010).
258. Id. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Second, if the “substantive rights” proviso has teeth, how sharp are
they? As explained in Part IV, Justice Stevens and the four dissenting
Justices will part company in Shady Grove on this issue.259 There,
Justice Stevens reads the term “substantive rights” in § 2072(b) more
narrowly than the dissent, applying the “bound up” standard
(reminiscent of Byrd) in which the state rule, in effect, “operate[s] to
define the rights and remedies available in a case,”260 rather than the
dissent’s “outcome determination” standard (reminiscent of Guaranty
Trust).261 As explained in Part IV, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent suggests
that the Court should avoid a collision between Rule 23 and the state
class action rule because, otherwise, application of Rule 23 would create
an outcome difference that would place in jeopardy the validity of Rule
23.262 I will consider in Part IV the impact of Justice Stevens’s
concurrence on the continuing viability of Sibbach’s single standard of
Rule validity.263
3. Does Hanna’s “Twin Aims” Version of the Outcome
Determination Test Supersede Byrd’s Balancing Approach?
As noted previously, the Gasperini Court rested its holding that
CPLR § 5501(c) provided the applicable standard for measuring the
excessiveness of the jury’s verdict on an RDA analysis applying
Hanna’s “twin aims” version of the outcome determination test instead
of Byrd’s balancing approach. Gasperini has been criticized for missing
an opportunity to clarify RDA analysis under Erie, particularly the
extent to which Byrd survives—or, on its merits, should survive.264
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion has been subject to varying interpretations in
this regard. Professor Rowe opined that, despite the Court’s reference to
Byrd, “Hanna’s ‘twin aims’ formulation remains the general and
dominant starting point for Erie cases involving judge-made federal
law.”265 Professor Freer minimized as lip service the Court’s reference
259. See infra Part IV.
260. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1455 n.13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
261. Id. at 1471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
262. See infra Part IV.
263. See infra Part IV.
264. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 11, at 1663 (“In Gasperini, the Court had another
opportunity—perhaps its best in a generation—to make a meaningful contribution to RDA analysis,
including the role of Byrd. Instead, the Court has left the field about as murky as it was before.”).
But see Rowe, supra note 6, at 966 (“The Gasperini majority opinion is not a shining model, but
neither does it strike me as a severe muddle.”).
265. Rowe, supra note 6, at 998; id. at 966 (“[The Gasperini majority opinion] does not appear
to mark a major shift in the Supreme Court’s Erie jurisprudence of the last third of a century.”); id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

43

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 4, Art. 4

9-KOPPEL_44.4_8.7.11_DONE-9.2.11.DOCM

1042

AKRON LAW REVIEW

9/12/2011 1:09 PM

[44:999

to Hanna’s “twin aims” test266 and, reading between the lines, suggested
that “Byrd—writ large—may have a strong future.”267 Professors
Wright, Miller, and Cooper read Gasperini’s Solomon-like, case-by-case
accommodation of federal and state interests to be consistent with Byrd:
“Given the Court’s repeated assertions [in Gasperini] that it is giving
effect to the substantive thrust of Section 5501(c) without untoward
alteration of the federal system, the Court seems to remain faithful to its
decision in Byrd.”268
Reflecting on Gasperini’s meaning, Justice Ginsburg’s more
revealing explication of her views on “Erie-Hanna” in her Shady Grove
dissent may shed some light on her opinion in Gasperini. Her Shady
Grove dissent blurs the line between the separate RDA and REA
analyses, employing the RDA-outcome determination test to inform her
understanding of the “substantive rights” proviso of the REA269 so that,
in her view, Federal Rules should be narrowly construed to avoid
outcome differences and the risk of an invalid application. As
at 968 (“The majority’s approach . . . confirms everything the Court had said on the point since it
modified the York ‘outcome determination’ test in Hanna.”); id. at 1007 (noting the author’s
“disagree[ment] with Professor Floyd when he asserts that ‘the Gasperini majority relied centrally
on Byrd . . . .’” (citing Floyd, supra note 14, at 270)).
266. Freer, supra note 11, at 1655 (“[The majority opinion’s] RDA analysis seems to proceed
in the wrong direction. Instead of using the twin aims test to determine whether the statute is
substantive, the Court declares that because the rule is substantive ‘it thus appears’ to ‘implicate’ the
twin aims test. The analysis does not lead to a conclusion; it is used to justify a conclusion already
reached. The twin aims test seems an afterthought.”).
267. Id. at 1660 (“Gasperini shows that Byrd survives Hanna and serves at least to identify
federal systemic interests. It is frustratingly mum, though, about Byrd’s future in any larger sense
. . . . But, reading between the lines of Gasperini, we can find that Byrd—writ large—may have a
strong future.”).
268. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4511 (“In the wake of Gasperini, the most pressing
question is whether the Court’s decision repudiates the promise in Byrd that the federal judiciary
would be an independent system for the administration of justice. But despite Justice Scalia’s
objections, the Court’s decision in Gasperini is a reasonable attempt to perform the balancing of
interests required by Byrd.”); id. (“In light of the substantial differences between the problems
present in the two cases, it is difficult to conclude that Gasperini departs from the precedent set in
Byrd. That conclusion requires one to turn a blind eye to the Court’s observation in Byrd that the
state rule was related to no rights and obligations created by state law, and the Court’s reservation in
Byrd that ‘the policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations . . . cannot in
every case exact compliance with a state rule—not bound up with rights and obligations—which
disrupts the federal system of allocating functions between judge and jury.’ Given the Court’s
repeated assertions [in Gasperini] that it is giving effect to the substantive thrust of Section 5501(c)
without untoward alteration of the federal system, the Court seems to remain faithful to its decision
in Byrd.”).
269. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1456 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“The dissent would apply the Rules of Decision Act inquiry under Erie
even to cases in which there is a governing federal rule and thus the Act, by its own terms, does not
apply.”).
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previously mentioned, the Court’s opinion in Gasperini did not directly
address the first question under Hanna’s two-part analysis—whether
Rule 59 covered the point in dispute and, if so, whether it would be valid
under the REA.270 I suggest that, in arguing for a narrow interpretation
of Federal Rule 23, Justice Ginsburg’s subsequent dissent in Shady
Grove does address that question. As I shall explain more fully in Part
IV, her opinion in Gasperini, in light of her subsequent dissent in Shady
Grove, may be best understood as an REA analysis, rather than an RDA
analysis, in which the Court narrowly interpreted Rule 59 to avoid what
it perceived would have been an invalid application of that rule under the
“substantive rights” proviso of § 2072(b).271 This reading supports
Professor Rowe’s suggestion that “the Court [in Gasperini] seemed to be
hinting that construing Rule 59 in such a way as to trump the state
verdict-excessiveness standard just might raise a problem under the
REA.”272
IV. THE FOREST: SEARCHING FOR A PRINCIPLED “ERIE” ANALYSIS IN
SHADY GROVE
The issue of Federal Rule validity under the REA, which Gasperini
did not address, is the focus of attention in Shady Grove, a diversity
action in which the majority broadly interpreted Federal Rule 23—a
procedural rule with powerful substantive impact273—to conflict with,
and preempt, New York’s CPLR § 901(b), which bars class actions to
enforce claims for penalties or statutory minimum damages.274 Despite
the class action’s powerful “substantive” impact on the damages remedy,
the majority emphasized its “procedural” character.275
The Justices engaged in line-drawing between “substance” and
“procedure” in the context of the REA,276 calibrating the appropriate
balance between the norm of national procedural uniformity within the

270. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 11, at 1641 (“Under the bifurcated analysis prescribed by
Hanna, the standard initial inquiry in Gasperini would have been whether Rule 59(a)(1) ‘cover[ed]
the point in dispute’ [citing Hanna ] or ‘[was] sufficiently broad to control the issue before the
Court,’ [citing Walker] or whether there is a ‘direct collision’ between it and the state provision
[citing Burlington].”).
271. See infra Part IV.
272. Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 996.
273. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010).
274. Id. at 1439.
275. Id. at 1444.
276. See, e.g., id. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“While it may not be easy to decide what is
actually a ‘substantive right,’ ‘the designations substantive and procedural become important, for
the Enabling Act has made them so.’”).
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federal judicial system and New York’s substantive state interests. In
calibrating this balance, their opinions represent different points along a
spectrum that accord varying degrees of weight to these federal and state
interests, from Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, according maximum
deference to the REA’s policy of federal procedural uniformity,277
through Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion, taking a centrist position
that still tips the delicate balance of judicial federalism in favor of the
federal interest in uniformity,278 to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, giving
maximum deference to state substantive interests with its attendant
potential for disrupting federal procedural uniformity.279
In addition to the core Erie theme of striking the appropriate
balance of judicial federalism between federal and state interests, Shady
Grove bears upon another theme which has been the recent focus of
scholarly attention among neo-Realists,280 in which increasingly
politicized “procedure” is viewed as substantive law in disguise:281 the
concept of procedure as normatively distinct from substantive rights and
remedies, a concept that is widely challenged as obsolete.282 In locating
the line between substance and procedure in Shady Grove,283 the Justices
debated the degree to which New York’s CPLR § 901(b) serves the
procedural goals of the fair and efficient conduct of litigation284 as
distinct from defining the scope of a substantive state-created right.285

277. Id. at 1448 (“But divergence from state law, with the attendant consequence of forum
shopping, is the inevitable (indeed, one might say the intended) result of a uniform system of federal
procedure.”).
278. Id. at 1448.
279. Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
280. See, e.g., Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 59.
281. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling
Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 668
(1993) (“Legal Realism revolutionized the [legal] profession’s thinking about law, making it
virtually impossible for thoughtful lawyers to regard litigation procedure and policy as completely
divorced from the politics of substantive outcomes.”); Main, supra note 57, at 803, 818-22
(“relat[ing] the familiar narrative about how procedure is inherently substantive”).
282. See generally Glenn S. Koppel, Reflections on the “Chimera” of a Uniform Code of State
Civil Procedure: The Virtue of Vision in Procedural Reform, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 971, 986-90
(2009).
283. See, e.g., Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1450 (Stevens J., concurring) (acknowledging that
“[t]he line between procedural and substantive law is hazy [citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins]” and
that, “in some situations, ‘procedure and substance are so interwoven that rational separation
becomes well-nigh impossible [citing Justice Rutledge’s dissent in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949)]”).
284. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“§ 901(b) rejects the use of
the class mechanism to pursue the particular remedy of statutory damages. The limitation was not
designed with the fair conduct or efficiency of litigation in mind.”); id. at 1458 n.16 (Stevens, J.,
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Finally, the opinions in Shady Grove reflect the spectrum of
formalist-realist perspectives in characterizing a rule as “procedural” or
“substantive,” from the formalism of Justice Scalia, who essentially
ignores the practical impact of procedural differences on substantive
rights and litigation outcomes286 and applies “the [state] statute’s clear
text,”287 to the mix of formalism and realism of Justice Stevens, who
would “allow for the [rare]288 possibility that a state rule that regulates
something traditionally considered to be procedural might actually
define a substantive right,”289 but who “respect[s] the plain textual
reading” of a rule located in the state’s procedural code when “there are
two plausible competing narratives” about the rule’s purpose,290 to the
full-blown realism291 of Justice Ginsburg, who characterizes a state
procedural rule as “substantive” if it is “outcome affective in the sense
our cases on Erie (pre- and post-Hanna) develop.”292
A.

Did Federal Rule 23 and New York’s CPLR § 901(b) Collide?

The Justices addressed Hanna’s two-step inquiry under the REA:
first, whether Rule 23 is “‘sufficiently broad’ to ‘control the issue’”293
and, second, whether Rule 23, as applied to preempt CPLR § 901(b), is
“valid” within the meaning of the REA. These two steps are not
hermetically sealed off from each other; citing Semtek, Justice Stevens

concurring) (characterizing New York’s procedural rule (C.P.L.R. § 901(b)) “as a general rule about
how its courts operate . . . .”).
285. See id. at 1453 n.8.
286. Id. at 1446-47 n.13 (Part II-C plurality opinion) (“The concurrence is correct . . . that
under our disposition any rule that ‘really regulates procedure’ . . . will pre-empt a conflicting state
rule, however ‘bound up’ the latter is with substantive law. The concurrence is wrong, however,
that that result proves our interpretation of § 2072(b) implausible. . . . The result is troubling only if
one stretches the term ‘substantive rights’ in § 2072(b) to mean not only state-law rights themselves,
but also any state-law procedures closely connected to them.”).
287. Id. at 1440.
288. Id. at 1455 n.13 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that it will be the “rare state rule[] that,
although ‘procedural’ in the ordinary sense of the term, operate[s] to define the rights and remedies
available in a case”).
289. Id. at 1453 n.8.
290. Id. at 1459-60.
291. Id. at 1463 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[Justice Stevens’] characterization of § 901(b)
[as a procedural rule that is not part of New York’s substantive law] does not mirror reality.”
(emphasis added)).
292. Id. at 1471.
293. Id. at 1451 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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commented that “the second step of the inquiry may well bleed back into
the first” to avoid an invalid application.294
On the first question—whether Rule 23 is broad enough to
“answer[ ] the question in dispute”295—the five-Justice majority, which
included Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion, found an unavoidable
conflict between Rule 23 and the state class action rule, because they
both addressed whether a class action may or may not be
The Court rejected “the dissent’s approach of
“maintained.”296
determining whether state and federal rules conflict based on the
subjective intentions of the state legislature.”297 The Court’s opinion
also rejected the Second Circuit’s distinction between “eligibility”—
addressed by the state rule—and “certifiability”—addressed by Federal
Rule 23.298
The dissent found no conflict between the two rules.
Notwithstanding that the New York rule, located in the state’s
procedural code, was framed as a procedural rule that addressed when a
class action may, or may not, be “maintained,” the dissent focused on
the purpose behind CPLR § 901(b) to make the case that the New York
legislature intended CPLR § 901(b) to affect the enforcement of a statecreated remedy for an infraction of state law, a “manifestly substantive
end,”299 albeit through the medium of the class action device. Thus,
according to the dissent, the state rule was not “procedural” in the
normative sense of a rule “designed with the fair conduct or efficiency of
litigation in mind.”300 Finding no conflict between Rule 23 and CPLR §
901(b), Justice Ginsburg’s dissent proceeded to an Erie-RDA analysis301
and concluded that the New York rule was substantive.302

294. Id. at 1452 (“When a federal rule appears to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive
right, federal courts must consider whether the rule can reasonably be interpreted to avoid that
impermissible result.”).
295. Id. at 1437.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1440-41.
298. Id. at 1438 (“The Second Circuit believed that § 901(b) and Rule 23 do not conflict
because they address different issues. Rule 23, it said, concerns only the criteria for determining
whether a given class can and should be certified; section 901(b), on the other hand, addresses an
antecedent question: whether the particular type of claim is eligible for class treatment in the first
place—a question on which Rule 23 is silent. Allstate embraces this analysis.”).
299. Id. at 1465 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
300. Id. But see id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The mere fact that a state law is
designed as a procedural rule suggests it reflects a judgment about how state courts ought to operate
and not a judgment about the scope of state-created rights and remedies.”).
301. Id. at 1469 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 1472.
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Although Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Ginsburg that “a
federal rule, like any federal law, must be interpreted in light of many
different considerations, including sensitivity to important state
interests,”303 he differed with her “about the degree to which the
meaning of federal rules may be contorted, absent congressional
authorization to do so, to accommodate state policy goals.”304 Although
in Gasperini, he sided, albeit in a dissenting opinion, with Justice
Ginsburg’s characterization of New York’s “materially deviates”
standard for reviewing jury awards as the equivalent of a statutory cap
on damages305 and, therefore, a “substantive” restriction on remedy, in
his concurrence in Shady Grove he disagreed with her “substantive”
characterization of New York’s limit on the use of class actions to
enforce statutory penalties. In what seems, at first glance, to be a
turnabout from his position in Gasperini, he concluded that CPLR §
901(b) “is a procedural rule that is not part of New York’s substantive
law,”306 notwithstanding that the New York rules at issue in each case
were both located in that state’s procedural code and, in both cases,
Justice Ginsburg characterized the two procedural rules as limitations on
the damages remedy.
B.

Is Federal Rule 23 “Valid” under the REA as Applied to Preempt
CPLR §901(b)?

As noted earlier, the REA contains two provisions that constrain the
federal judiciary’s rulemaking power and, therefore, a Federal Rule’s
validity.307 First, to qualify as a rule of “practice and procedure” as
interpreted by the Court in Hanna, a Federal Rule must “really regulat[e]
procedure”308 and, second, the Rule must not “abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.”309 Sibbach gave short shrift to the
second, “substantive rights,” provision as an additional constraint on
Rule validity, articulating a single test for determining Federal Rule
303. Id. at 1451 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1453 n.8 (“A rule about how damages are reviewed on appeal may really be a
damages cap. See Gasperini [v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc.], 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).”).
306. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1453 n.8.
307. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (“(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts
(including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals. (b) Such rules shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of
no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”).
308. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965).
309. Id.
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validity: whether the Rule “really regulates procedure.”310 Hanna
merely reaffirmed Sibbach, but failed to elaborate on the substantive
rights proviso’s meaning. In Professor Ely’s words, “the text of the
opinion did little more, so far as the interpretation of the Enabling Act
was concerned, than point to Sibbach.”311 And, as observed by
Professors Teply and Whitten, none of the Court’s “Erie” opinions since
Hanna, including Gasperini, “provide[d] much guidance about how the
Rules Enabling branch of the Erie doctrine should operate.”312 As
explained in this section, Shady Grove does provide some guidance on
this long-neglected question.
1. Is REA § 2072(b)—the “Substantive Rights” Proviso—an
Independent Constraint on Federal Rule Validity?
The Court split three ways on the limits imposed by the REA on the
federal court’s rulemaking power. The plurality, and Justice Stevens,
found it necessary to “confront head-on whether Rule 23 falls within the
statutory authorization”313 because, in the concluding paragraph of the
majority portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion, “[w]hat the dissent’s
approach achieves is not the avoiding of a ‘conflict between Rule 23 and
§ 901(b)’ . . . but, rather the invalidation of Rule 23 (pursuant to §
2072(b) of the Rules Enabling Act) to the extent that it conflicts with the
substantive policies of § 901.”314 The plurality, led by Justice Scalia, not
only reaffirmed Sibbach’s “really regulates procedure” test, but broadly
interpreted that test to effectively render the “substantive rights” proviso
mere surplusage.315 Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, and, by
310. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
311. Ely, supra note 50, at 720.
312. TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 53, at 491. See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, at §
4508 (“The possible independent significance of this statutory limitation . . . to date has received
little attention from the Supreme Court . . . .”); id. at 260 (“Although the Supreme Court never has
addressed the question specifically, it so far has not seemed inclined to attribute much significance
to the ‘substantive rights’ proviso.”).
313. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010).
314. Id. at 1442. Although Justice Sotomayor did not join the Part II-C plurality, neither did
she join Justice Stevens’ concurrence. She did, however, agree with the plurality’s view that the
Court has “held since Sibbach, and reaffirmed repeatedly, that the validity of a Federal Rule
depends entirely upon whether it regulates procedure. . . . If it does, it is authorized by §2072 and is
valid in all jurisdictions, with respect to all claims, regardless of its incidental effect upon statecreated rights.” Id. at 1444 (Part II-B plurality opinion).
315. Id. at 1442 (“We have long held that this limitation [that Federal Rules shall not ‘abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right’] means that the Rule must “really regulat[e] procedure,—
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” The test is not whether the
rule affects a litigant's substantive rights; most procedural rules do. What matters is what the rule
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implication, the four dissenting Justices—a majority of five—rejected
the plurality’s view that “the sole Enabling Act question is whether the
federal rule ‘really regulates procedure,’”316 so that a Federal Rule that
qualifies as “procedural” under the REA’s first provision can be
rendered invalid, as applied, under the “substantive rights” proviso, if
the state “procedural” rule it would displace is “sufficiently interwoven
with the scope of a substantive right or remedy . . . .”317
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent strongly suggests its agreement with
Justice Stevens’s position, in his concurrence, that the “substantive
rights” proviso functions as an independent limit on Rule validity by
quoting, among the points on which the two opinions “stake common
ground,” the following statement made by Justice Stevens in the context
of his discussion of the “substantive rights” proviso’s congressionallyimposed limit on the Court’s rulemaking power:
“[F]ederal rules,” he observes, “must be interpreted with some degree
of ‘sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies,’ . . .
and applied to diversity cases against the background of Congress’
command that such rules not alter substantive rights and with
consideration of ‘the degree to which the Rule makes the character and
result of the federal litigation strayfrom the course it would follow in
state courts.’”318

The congressional “command” to which Justice Stevens referred is
the “substantive rights” proviso. Further, the text of the Hanna opinion,
quoted by Justice Stevens in the above passage, also relates to the issue
of Rule validity under the REA. Finally, although the dissent does not

itself regulates: If it governs only “the manner and the means” by which the litigants’ rights are
“enforced,” it is valid; if it alters “the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those]
rights,” it is not.” (emphasis original, internal citations omitted)). Id. at 1446 (“Sibbach has been
settled law . . . for nearly seven decades. Setting aside any precedent requires a ‘special
justification’ beyond a bare belief that it was wrong.”). See also id. at 1446 n.12 (“The concurrence
implies that Sibbach has slipped into desuetude, apparently for lack of sufficient citations. . . . We
are unaware of any rule to the effect that a holding of ours expires if the case setting it forth is not
periodically revalidated. In any event, the concurrence’s account of our shunning of Sibbach is
greatly exaggerated. Hanna did not merely cite the case, but recognized it as establishing the
governing rule.”).
316. Id. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing the plurality opinion).
317. Id. at 1456.
318. Id. at 1464 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
Similarly, another statement in Justice Stevens’ concurrence, quoted by the dissent as “staking
common ground” with the dissent, was made in the context of the limits imposed by the REA on
Rule validity: “When a State chooses to use a traditionally procedural vehicle as a means of
defining the scope of substantive rights or remedies, federal courts must recognize and respect that
choice.” Id. at 1450 (Stevens J., concurring).
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directly address the validity of Rule 23 under the REA, because it found
no conflict with the state rule, Justice Ginsburg does acknowledge that a
narrow interpretation of a Federal Rule, especially Rule 23, may indicate
an awareness of the limits imposed by the REA on Rule validity: “In
interpreting the scope of the Rules, including, in particular Rule 23, we
have been mindful of the limits on our authority [under § 2072(b)].”319
Even though these five Justices appear to agree—either expressly
or, in the case of the dissent, by implication—that the “substantive
rights” proviso functions as an additional constraint on Federal Rules
validity, Shady Grove’s bottom-line result nevertheless upheld the
validity of Rule 23 as applied to preempt a state class action rule which
New York’s legislature had designed to avoid “overkill” in the
enforcement of a state-law damage remedy.
An explanation of this seemingly incongruous result lies in the
disagreement between Justice Stevens and the dissenting Justices over
how interwoven the state’s procedural rule must be with the state’s
substantive right or remedy to run afoul of § 2072(b)’s restriction.
Rejecting the dissent’s broad interpretation of § 2072(b) that defines
“substantive” as “outcome determinative,”320 Justice Stevens inquired
whether the state rule is “so intertwined with a state right or remedy that
it functions to define the scope of the state-created right.”321 Although
Justice Stevens agreed with the Court’s application of Rule 23 over
CPLR § 901(b), he did so on the grounds that the state rule was
“procedural” and therefore Rule 23, as applied in this case, did not
abridge a substantive state right under § 2072(b).322

319. Id. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. (quoting Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 845 (1999) (“The Rules Enabling Act counsels against ‘adventurous application’ of Rule 23;
any tension with the Act ‘is best kept within tolerable limits.’”). Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1468
n.10 (“The plurality notes that ‘we have rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has
come before us.’ . . . But it omits that we have interpreted Rules with due restraint, including Rule
23, thus diminishing the prospects for the success of such challenges.”). See also id. at 1452
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]he second step of the inquiry [i.e., if the Federal Rule is
sufficiently broad to control the issue in dispute, whether application of the Federal Rule is a valid
exercise of the Court’s rulemaking authority] may well bleed back into the first [i.e., whether the
Federal Rule is sufficiently broad to control the issue in dispute and, therefore, conflicts with the
state rule].”).
320. Id. at 1459 (“The difference of degree is relevant to the forum shopping considerations
that are part of the Rules of Decision Act or Erie inquiry. If the applicable federal rule did not
govern the particular question at issue (or could be fairly read not to do so), then those
considerations would matter . . . . But that is not this case.”).
321. Id. at 1452.
322. Id. at 1449.
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The plurality argued that Sibbach’s validity inquiry, as reaffirmed
in Hanna,323 focused solely on the Federal Rule in question—not on the
procedural or substantive character of the state rule under § 2072(b) of
the REA. The plurality minimized the substantial impact of a class
action on the enforcement of individual claims too small to pursue
individually: “The likelihood that some (even many) plaintiffs will be
induced to sue by the availability of a class action is just the sort of
‘incidental effect[s]’ we have long held does not violate § 2072(b).”324
Justice Scalia—true to his plain text approach to statutory
interpretation325—avoided delving into legislative intent altogether to
determine whether the state rule conflicts326 as well as in determining
rule validity; in the plurality’s view, the nature of the state rule is
irrelevant as long as the federal rule “really regulates procedure.”327
In Part II-C of the plurality’s opinion,328 Justice Scalia pressed his
point even further about the irrelevance of outcome determinative state
procedure in determining the Federal Rule’s validity. Taking aim
directly at Justice Stevens’s concurrence, Part II-C asserts that “any rule
that ‘really regulates procedure,’ . . . will pre-empt a conflicting state
rule, however ‘bound up’ the latter is with substantive law.”329 In a
rejoinder, Justice Stevens suggested that Justice Scalia’s approach
involved circular reasoning since “[i]t is hard to [figure out whether a
federal rule is really ‘procedural’] without considering the nature and
functions of the state law that the federal rule will displace.”330 In his
323. Id. at 1444 (“Hanna unmistakably expressed the same understanding [as Sibbach] that
compliance of a Federal Rule with the Enabling Act is to be assessed by consulting the rule itself
and not its effects in individual applications.”).
324. Id. at 1443 (emphasis added).
325. See Scalia, supra note 64, at 1184 (“[I]t is perhaps easier for me than it is for some judges
to develop general rules, because I am more inclined to adhere closely to the plain meaning of a
text.”).
326. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1439 (“Unlike a law that sets a ceiling on damages (or puts
other remedies out of reach) in properly filed class actions, § 901(b) says nothing about what
remedies a court may award; it prevents the class actions it covers from coming into existence at
all.”); id. at 1439 n.4 (“§ 901(b) does not conflict because it addresses not the remedy, but the
procedural right to maintain a class action.”); id. at 1440 (“The dissent all but admits that the literal
terms of § 901(b) address the same subject as Rule 23—i.e., whether a class action may be
maintained—but insists the provision’s purpose is to restrict only remedies.”); id. (“But even
accepting the dissent’s account of the Legislature’s objective at face value, it cannot override the
statute’s clear text. Even if its aim is to restrict the remedy a plaintiff can obtain, § 901(b) achieves
that end by limiting a plaintiff’s power to maintain a class action. The manner in which the law
‘could have been written’ has no bearing; what matters is the law the Legislature did enact.”).
327. Id. at 1444.
328. Justice Sotomayor also did not join Justice Stevens’ concurrence.
329. Id. at 1446 n.13(emphasis added).
330. Id. at 1454 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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words, “[t]he plurality’s ‘test’ is no test at all—in a sense, it is little more
than the statement that a matter is procedural if, by revelation, it is
procedural.”331
From the point of view of calibrating the balance inherent in the
REA between federal procedural uniformity and deference to substantive
state policies,332 the plurality’s interpretation of the REA reflects the
paramount importance it attributes to the congressional policy of
procedural uniformity throughout the federal judicial system:333 “A
Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions and invalid
in others—or valid in some cases and invalid in others—depending upon
whether its effect is to frustrate a state substantive law (or a state
procedural law enacted for substantive purposes).”334
Justice Scalia’s dismissal of the “substantive rights” proviso as
surplusage is difficult to square, however, with his statement in Semtek
that an interpretation of Rule 41(b) as a rule of claim preclusion “would
arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act:
that the Rules ‘shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.’”335
Shady Grove nevertheless augurs the Court’s shift away from
Sibbach’s inflexible single test of Federal Rule validity because a
different majority—consisting of Justice Stevens in his concurrence and,
by implication though not expressly, Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy,
Breyer, and Alito in their dissent—appears to have rejected the
plurality’s view that § 2072(b) lacks independent significance. Agreeing
that “federal rules must be interpreted with some degree of ‘sensitivity to
important state interests and regulatory policies,’”336 these five Justices
implicitly interpreted the “substantive rights” proviso of the REA as an
additional constraint on the Court’s rulemaking power. To ignore this
second limitation on rule validity, Justice Stevens cautioned, “ignores
331. Id. at 1454 n.10 (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 4509).
332. Id. at 1453.
333. Id. at 1446 (“Sibbach’s exclusive focus on the challenged Federal Rule—driven by the
very real concern that Federal Rules which vary from State to State would be chaos . . .—is hard to
square with § 2072(b)’s terms.”). See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (“Apart from
the fact already stated, that the policy of the states in this respect has not been uniform, it is to be
noted that the authorization of a comprehensive system of court rules was a departure in policy, and
that the new policy envisaged in the enabling act of 1934 was that the whole field of court
procedure be regulated in the interest of speedy, fair, and exact determination of the truth. The
challenged rules comport with this policy.”).
334. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444.
335. Semtek Int’l v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001).
336. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996)); id. at 1463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the balance that Congress struck between uniform rules of federal
procedure and respect for a State’s construction of its own rights and
remedies.”337
2. The Scope of the “Substantive Rights” Proviso: How Sharp Are
Its Teeth to Protect State Substantive Policy Interests?
Although both Justice Stevens and, by implication, the dissenting
Justices, agree that the “substantive rights” proviso operates to render
invalid “procedural” rules that abridge, enlarge or modify “substantive”
rights, and that Federal Rules should be narrowly interpreted to avoid
invalidity under the Enabling Act,338 they parted company on the
meaning of the statutory phrase “substantive right.” Several definitions
have in the past been proposed. Professor Ely offered a normative
definition of a “substantive rule” as “a right granted for one or more
nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do
with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.”339 Justice
Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Hanna, adopted Hart and
Wechsler’s standard that characterizes as substantive, for both RDA and
REA purposes, rules that “affect those primary decisions respecting
human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state
regulation.”340
In Shady Grove, Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, as
interpreted by Justice Stevens, expanded the definition of “substantive”
beyond the foregoing to include outcome determinative procedural
rules.341 However, the dissent’s analysis of “substantive rights” also
employed a normative approach, reminiscent of Professor Ely’s
definition, which emphasized the legislative purpose behind the state
rule.342 Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion proposed a more restrictive
337. Id. at 1453 (Stevens, J., concurring).
338. As noted by Justice Stevens, the first inquiry whether a Federal Rule and state rule
conflict, and the second inquiry whether the Federal Rule is valid if applied over the state rule are
but two sides of the same coin, since the latter inquiry “may well bleed back into the first.” Id. at
1452.
339. Ely, supra note 50, at 725 (emphasis added).
340. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965).
341. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“At bottom, the
dissent’s interpretation of Rule 23 seems to be that Rule 23 covers only those cases in which its
application would create no Erie problem. The dissent would apply the Rules of Decision Act
inquiry under Erie even to cases in which there is a governing federal rule, and thus the Act, by its
own terms, does not apply. But ‘[w]hen a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the
question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice.’ Hanna, 380
U.S. at 471.”).
342. Id. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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definition suggestive of Byrd’s reference to “intimately bound up” state
rules.343 The difference between Justice Stevens and the dissent in
determining what constitutes a “substantive” right centers on how tight
the nexus must be between the state “procedural” rule and a state
“substantive right” so that the state rule can be deemed “sufficiently
interwoven with the scope of a substantive right or remedy [to create]
an Enabling Act problem . . . .”344 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
adopted the most restrictive standard according to which legislative
purpose “cannot override the [state] statute’s clear text.”345
a. The Dissent’s Broad Construction of “Substantive Rights”
under § 2072(b)
In the Court’s view,346 and mine, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent broadly
construed the term “substantive” in §2072(b) to embrace outcome
determinative state procedure, in effect merging, once again, the RDA
and REA analyses to determine the validity and applicability of a
Federal Rule.347 But, in addition to outcome determination, the dissent
also considered—as did the Court’s opinion in Gasperini—the
legislative purpose behind the state rule, employing a normative

343. Id. at 1458 (Stevens, J., concurring).
344. Id. at 1456.
345. Id. at 1440 (“Even if [the Legislature’s] aim is to restrict the remedy a plaintiff can obtain,
§ 901(b) achieves that end by limiting a plaintiff’s power to maintain a class action. The manner in
which the law ‘could have been written,’ . . . has no bearing; what matters is the law the Legislature
did enact.”).
346. Id. at 1442; id. at 1456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The dissent would apply the Rules
of Decision Act inquiry under Erie even to cases in which there is a governing federal rule, and thus
the Act, by its own terms, does not apply. . . . Justice Ginsburg’s approach would, in my view, work
an end run around Congress’ system of uniform federal rules.”).
347. Id. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In interpreting the scope of the Rules, including, in
particular, Rule 23, we have been mindful of the limits on our authority. See, e.g., Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999) (“The Rules Enabling Act counsels against
‘adventurous application’ of Rule 23; any tension with the Act ‘is best kept within tolerable
limits.’”). . . . Recognizing that the Rules of Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act
simultaneously frame and inform the Erie analysis, we have endeavored in diversity suits to remain
safely within the bounds of both congressional directives.”). Justice Ginsburg’s dissent also
suggests a merger of the RDA and REA analyses in its discussion of Erie’s significance early in the
opinion by quoting from Justice Harlan’s concurrence which criticized the Hanna Court’s
bifurcated RDA-REA analyses: “Justice Harlan aptly conveyed the importance of the doctrine; he
described Erie as ‘one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that
profoundly touch the allocation of judicial power between the state and federal systems.” Shady
Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1460 (Ginsburg J., dissenting) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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approach similar to Professor Ely’s normatively-based definition of
“substantive.”348
[Section 901(b)’s class action] limitation was not designed with the
fair conduct or efficiency of litigation in mind, . . . , New York’s
decision instead to block class-action proceedings for statutory
damages, therefore, makes scant sense, except as a means to a
manifestly substantive end: Limiting a defendant’s liability in a single
lawsuit in order to prevent the exorbitant inflation of penalties—
remedies the New York Legislature created with individual suits in
mind.349

The dissent’s use of outcome determination to decide whether a
Federal Rule abridges a state substantive remedy or right within the
meaning of § 2072(b) effectively imports Guaranty Trust’s “unguided”
“Erie” analysis under the RDA, as modified by Hanna’s “twin aims”
approach, into the REA analysis, extending Erie’s reach into the domain
of federal procedure. The dissent’s position that a Federal Rule should
be narrowly interpreted to avoid an invalid application of the Rule by
preempting an outcome determinative state procedure appears to circle
back to pre-Hanna jurisprudence that did not recognize the two distinct
REA and RDA analytical tracks.350 The dissent’s conflation of the two
tests is reminiscent of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Hanna—which
Justice Ginsburg cited351—in which he opposed the Court’s holding that
the REA and the RDA run on two separate tracks and, therefore, that

348. Professor Freer commented that Justice Ginsburg similarly conflated these two
approaches to classifying a state rule as “substantive” or “procedural” in Gasperini but in the RDA,
rather than REA, context:
Instead of using the twin aims test [of outcome determination] to determine whether the
statute is substantive, the Court declares that because the rule is substantive [because it is
the functional equivalent of a statutory cap on damages and therefore “manifestly
substantive”] “it thus appears” to “implicate” the twin aims test. . . . The twin aims test
seems an afterthought.
Freer, supra note 11, at 1655.
349. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
350. On remand, the trial judge in Gasperini interpreted the Court’s decision as a return to the
application of Guaranty Trust’s outcome determinative test to the Federal Rules:
The Supreme Court decision in this case represents an extension of Erie doctrine, or
more likely a reversion by the Supreme Court to prior Erie doctrine since abandoned, of
which Guaranty Trust Co. v. York . . . is the outstanding example. The Supreme Court in
Guaranty Trust and again in Gasperini seems to have endorsed the outcomedeterminative test to determine whether a disputed point of law is procedural, and
therefore governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and case law developed
thereunder, or substantive so as to be governed by state law.
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 765, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
351. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Erie is inapplicable to determine rule validity of an on-point Federal
Rule.352 In 1974, Professor Ely attributed “the monolithic ‘Erie
doctrine’s’ continued pervasion of the literature” post-Hanna to Justice
Harlan’s prestige:
“The clear assumption of his otherwise sensitive discussion was that
all choices between state and federal law in diversity actions are
controlled by a single doctrine, the Erie doctrine, and that that doctrine
is of constitutional magnitude and therefore indiscriminately applicable
whether there is a Federal Rule covering the point in dispute or not.”353

Justice Stevens rejected the dissent’s application of the outcome
determinative approach to test Federal Rule validity under § 2072(b) of
the REA: “The dissent would apply the Rules of Decision Act inquiry
under Erie even to cases in which there is a governing federal rule, and
thus the Act, by its own terms, does not apply.”354 Acknowledging the
impact of CPLR § 901(b) to promote forum shopping in federal court,
Justice Stevens went on to elaborate:
If the applicable federal rule did not govern the particular question at
issue (or could be fairly read not to do so), then [forum shopping]
considerations would matter, for precisely the reasons given by the
dissent. . . . But that is not this case. As the Court explained in Hanna,
it is an ‘incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie R. Co. v.
Thompkins[sic] constitutes the appropriate test of . . . the applicability
of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure’ . . . . ‘It is true that both the
Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that federal courts are to
apply state “substantive” law and federal “procedural” law,’ but the
tests are different and reflect the fact that ‘they were designed to
control very different sorts of decisions.’”355

Justice Ginsburg’s apparent conflation of REA and RDA standards,
in her Shady Grove dissent, to accommodate “New York’s legitimate
interest in keeping certain monetary awards reasonably bounded”356 by
applying an outcome determination analysis sheds light on the
underlying basis for the Court’s opinion in Gasperini, which she also
authored. In Gasperini, rather than initially tackling the first part of the
Hanna analysis—whether Rule 59, that governs new trial motions, also
controls the standard for reviewing the reasonableness of jury awards—

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Ely, supra note 50, at 699.
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 1459 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. 460).
Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Justice Ginsburg addressed this issue cursorily in a footnote that
responded to Justice Scalia’s dissenting view that Rule 59 controlled this
point.357 Instead, in analyzing whether to apply the federal “shocks the
conscience” standard or New York’s “materially deviates” standard,
Justice Ginsburg proceeded directly to an Erie analysis, applying the
outcome determination test:
[W]hether New York’s ”deviates materially” standard, codified in
CPLR § 5501(c), is outcome affective in this sense: Would
“application of the [standard] . . . have so important an effect upon the
fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to [apply] it would
[unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or] be likely
to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court?”358

Extrapolating the more explicit RDA-REA analysis in her Shady
Grove dissent to her opinion in Gasperini, and reading between the
lines, one may interpret Justice Ginsburg’s Gasperini opinion as having
narrowly construed Rule 59 to avoid what she believed to be a violation
of the “substantive rights” proviso of the Enabling Act.
Professor Steinman builds upon Gasperini’s “Erie” incursion into
the Federal Rules, in an article written before Shady Grove, by taking the
Court’s approach one step further. Responding to the conservative
complexion of the federal bench,359 he contends that Erie jurisprudence
has evolved to the point where federal courts, in diversity suits, are now
required to ignore federal case law interpretations of the Federal Rules,
like summary judgment, class certification, and pleading, applying statelaw standards instead.360 In language evocative of Justice Ginsburg’s
approach to REA analysis, Professor Steinman writes: “[F]ederal
approaches to summary judgment, class certification, and pleading may
so profoundly impact a litigant’s ability to enforce substantive rights that
they exceed the federal judiciary’s statutory authority to promulgate
positive law procedural rules such as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”361 He extends the logic of Gasperini’s holding “that the

357. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 n.22 (1996).
358. Id. at 428 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468).
359. See Nelson et al., supra note 37, at 1776 n.95 (“[T]here are significantly fewer
Democratic appointees serving on the lower courts. For example, there are currently sixty-three
Democrats sitting on the federal circuit courts of appeals, compared with 101 Republicans. The
numbers were very briefly even at the close of the Clinton administration—seventy-six and seventysix, but given Republican domination of the White House since 1968, Republican-appointed judges
typically have constituted a majority of federal circuit court judges in recent decades.”).
360. Steinman, supra note 23.
361. Id. at 251.
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Federal Rules themselves did not impose the shock-the-conscience
standard that had long applied in federal court” to “suggest[] that the
federal judiciary’s gloss on the Federal Rules’ generalized language for
pleading, summary judgment, and class certification is, for Erie
purposes, procedural common law that is not mandated by the Rules
themselves.”362 It is in these procedural areas especially that Professor
Steinman notes the imprimatur of a pro-defendant, conservative federal
bench. In legal realist fashion, his approach—motivated by the
“procedural disparities [that] are at the core of the contemporary politics
of judicial federalism”363—seeks to “recalibrate the conventional
understanding of judicial federalism in civil adjudication”364 in the same
manner that “Justice Brandeis’ ruling in Erie restrained a pro-corporate
federal judiciary.”365
As mentioned earlier, Professor Rowe, in an article published
before Professor Steinman’s, and before Shady Grove, expressed doubt
that Gasperini heralded “problematically broad readings” of that
decision by the courts that would reduce the Federal Rules to “mere
empty containers waiting to be filled in by state procedural rules.”366 In
hindsight, that doubt appears justified by the majority’s rejection of the
dissent’s approach to the Federal Rules in Shady Grove.367
b. Justice Stevens’s Narrow Construction of “Substantive Rights”
under § 2072(b): A Pivotal Opinion
Justice Stevens’s concurrence narrowly interpreted “substantive
rights” in § 2072(b) to apply to the rare state procedure that defines the
scope of a substantive right or remedy.368 Quoting Professor Ely’s
comment thirty-six years earlier that “almost ‘any rule can be said to
362. Id. at 284.
363. Id. at 248.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Rowe, supra note 6, at 994 n.126 (quoting King, supra note 245, at 183).
367. See also Ely, supra note 50, at 721 (“The limiting language of the Enabling Act’s second
sentence (‘abridge, enlarge or modify’) is strong and on its face might be taken to command the
application of state law in any situation covered by the refined outcome determination test that
Hanna suggested for the Rules of Decision Act. . . . But as an interpretation of the Rules Enabling
Act, it would seem that this approach must fail, since it would eviscerate the Rules and thereby
render the Act almost entirely self-defeating.”).
368. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1455 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“Although most state rules bearing on the litigation process are adopted
for some policy reason, few seemingly ‘procedural’ rules define the scope of a substantive right or
remedy.”); id. at 1455 n.13 (referring to “those rare state rules that, although ‘procedural’ in the
ordinary sense of the term, operate to define the rights and remedies available in a case.”).
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have . . . ‘substantive effects,’ affecting society’s distribution of risks
and rewards,’”369 Justice Stevens rejected the outcome determination test
in favor of a more restrictive “substantive rights” test that suggests
Byrd’s “integrally bound” category of state procedural rule:370 “it is
necessary to distinguish between procedural rules adopted for some
policy reason and seemingly procedural rules that are intimately bound
up in the scope of a substantive right or remedy.”371 As noted earlier,
Byrd distinguished between a state rule that is so “bound up” with the
enforcement of a state-created right that it is functionally part of the
definition of that right—and should, thus, be enforced by the federal
court to the same extent as a substantive right372—and a state court rule
“of form and mode” which, though procedural in the sense of regulating
the conduct of litigation inside the courthouse, may have a substantial
outcome effect on the enforcement of that right. Byrd restricted the
application of outcome determination analysis to “form and mode” rules
and further attenuated its influence by counterbalancing it with the
countervailing interests of the “federal system [as] an independent
system for administering justice.”373
In drawing the line between substance and procedure, Justice
Stevens focused on whether there is a sufficient nexus between the state
rule and the scope of the substantive right or remedy to classify the state
rule as “substantive”: “I readily acknowledge that if a federal rule
displaces a state rule that is ‘“procedural” in the ordinary sense of the
term’ . . . but sufficiently interwoven with the scope of a substantive
right or remedy, there would be an Enabling Act problem, and the
federal rule would have to give way.”374 But Justice Stevens set a “high

369. Id. at 1457; Ely, supra note 50, at 724 n.170 (“[I]t would seem that any rule can be said to
have both ‘procedural effects,’ affecting the way in which litigation is conducted, and ‘substantive
effects,’ affecting society’s distribution of risks and rewards. . . . Thus, an ‘effects test’ would seem
destined either to unintelligibility or to the invalidation of every Federal Rule, thereby rendering the
Enabling Act entirely self-defeating.”).
370. Although Professor Freer observed that “the Court has never undertaken to define ‘bound
up,’” he, like Justice Stevens, considers “bound up” rules the functional equivalent of rules that
“serve to define or refine the state’s assessment of when someone is entitled to recover.” Freer,
supra note 11, at 1648.
371. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1458 (2010) (Stevens J., concurring) (emphasis added).
372. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958) (“It was decided in Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins that the federal courts in diversity cases must respect the definition of statecreated rights and obligations by the state courts. We must, therefore, first examine the rule in
Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co. to determine whether it is bound up with these rights and obligations
in such a way that its application in the federal court is required.”).
373. Id. at 538.
374. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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bar” for “finding an Enabling Act problem:”375 “The mere possibility
that a federal rule would alter a state-created right is not sufficient.
There must be little doubt.”376 His concern that Justice Ginsburg’s
approach would “work an end run around Congress’ system of uniform
federal rules”377 harks back to Professor Ely’s warning thirty-six years
earlier about “import[ing] the Rules of Decision Act’s standard into the
Enabling Act”:
If [the] wholesale defeat of the Enabling Act is to be avoided, its
interpretation must be geared not to the lawsuit’s ultimate outcome, but
rather to the character of the state provision that enforcement of the
Federal rule in question will supplant, in particular to whether the state
provision embodies a substantive policy or represents only a
procedural disagreement with the federal rulemakers respecting the
fairest and most efficient way of conducting litigation.378

Justice Stevens was the only member of the Court’s majority who
argued that a Federal Rule can be valid on its face, because it “really
regulates procedure,” yet invalid as applied because it violates the
“substantive rights” provision of the REA.379 Yet he voted with the
majority because he cabined § 2072(b)’s independent force more
narrowly than the dissent. Justice Stevens’s pivotal doctrinal position in
Shady Grove, therefore, lies in the middle of the spectrum that accords
differing degrees of weight in balancing competing federal and state
interests—between the plurality, which strikes the balance on one end of
the spectrum in favor of federal rules uniformity,380 and the dissent,
which strikes the balance on the other end that favors deference to state
interests at the expense of Federal Rules uniformity.381
Since Justice Stevens provided the pivotal vote for the majority of
five that applied Rule 23 over the state rule, a closer analysis of his
concurrence is critical to an understanding of the import—and possibly
the future precedential impact—of Shady Grove in calibrating the

375. Id. at 1457 (“In my view, however, the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a high
one. The mere fact that a state law is designed as a procedural rule suggests it reflects a judgment
about how state courts ought to operate and not a judgment about the scope of state-created
rights.”).
376. Id. (noting that “for the purposes of operating a federal court system, there are costs
involved in attempting to discover the true nature of a state procedural rule and allowing such a rule
to operate alongside a federal rule that appears to govern the same question.”).
377. Id. at 1457.
378. Ely, supra note 50, at 722.
379. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring).
380. Id. at 1448.
381. Id. at 1463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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balance of judicial power between the federal judiciary’s interest in
procedural uniformity and the states’ substantive interests. In Marks v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds. . . .’”382 Unlike the plurality, which relied on the
plain meaning of Rule 23 alone to determine its validity regardless of the
New York Legislature’s purpose behind the state rule,383 Justice Stevens,
like the dissent, was willing—to a point—to delve into the state rule’s
legislative history to determine whether the state rule is intertwined
enough with the definition of state substantive rights and remedies to
invalidate the candidate Federal Rule under the “substantive rights”
proviso.384 But this formulation begs the question how closely tied the
state procedure must be to the state substantive right or remedy in order
for the state’s interest to outweigh the federal interest in procedural
uniformity.
A key to an answer may lie in attempting to reconcile Justice
Stevens’s characterization of New York’s “deviates materially” rule in
Gasperini as “substantive” with his characterization of New York’s
CPLR § 901(b) in Shady Grove as “procedural.” Both New York rules
appear in the CPLR, the state’s procedural statute, and Justice Ginsburg,
in Gasperini and her dissent in Shady Grove, characterized both
procedural rules as damages limitations and, therefore, “substantive.”385
For Justice Stevens, when the legislative history is ambiguous, the “plain
textual reading” of the state law should prevail.386 In concluding his
concurrence, Justice Stevens stressed the great weight he attached to the
“plain textual meaning” of statutory text: “In order to displace a federal

382. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n.15 (1976)).
383. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440 (“But even accepting the dissent’s account of the
Legislature’s objective at face value, it cannot override the statute’s clear text.”).
384. Id. at 1455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
385. Id. at 1464 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
386. Id. at 1459-60 (Stevens J., concurring) (“Although one can argue that class certification
would enlarge New York’s ‘limited’ damages remedy, . . . such arguments rest on extensive
speculation about what the New York Legislature had in mind when it created § 901(b). But given
that there are two plausible competing narratives, it seems obvious to me that we should respect the
plain textual reading of § 901(b), a rule in New York’s procedural code about when to certify class
actions brought under any source of law, and respect Congress’ decision that Rule 23 governs class
certification in federal courts.”).
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rule, there must be more than just a possibility that the state rule is
different than it appears.”387
In Gasperini, Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, agreed with
Justice Ginsburg that the legislative history behind New York’s CPLR §
5501(c) clearly showed the legislature’s intent “to change the
substantive law of the State.”388 By contrast, in Shady Grove, he found
the legislative history behind § 901(b) “does not clearly describe a
judgment that § 901(b) would operate as a limitation on New York’s
statutory damages.”389 Turning to the text of § 901(b), which “expressly
and unambiguously applies not only to claims based on New York law
but also to claims based on federal law or the law of any other State,”
Justice Stevens found it “hard to see how § 901(b) could be understood
as a rule that, though procedural in form, serves the function of defining
New York’s rights and remedies.”390 The text of § 901(b), like the text
of Rule 23, speaks in procedural terms of when class actions may or may
not be “maintained.”391 Because the New York Legislature designed §
901(b) to address the normatively procedural matter of “how its courts
operate,” Justice Stevens was not willing to presume § 901(b) was
intended to limit only remedies created by New York law.392 This use of
the statute’s “plain text” as a default tool of interpretation is akin to
Justice Scalia’s formalist approach that errs in favor of maintaining the
uniformity of the Federal Rules.393 This formalist approach functions to

387. Id. at 1460.
388. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 440 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“The Court correctly explains why the 1986 enactment of § 5501(c) of the [C.P.L.R.] changed the
substantive law of the State. A state-law ceiling on allowable damages, whether fixed by a dollar
limit or by a standard that forbids any award that ‘deviates materially . . . from what would be
reasonable compensation’ is a substantive rule of decision that federal courts must apply in diversity
cases governed by New York law. . . . I recognize that state rules of appellate procedure do not
necessarily bind federal appellate courts. The majority persuasively shows, however, that New
York has not merely adopted a new procedure for allocating the decision making function between
trial and appellate courts. . . . Instead, New York courts have held that all jury awards, not only
those reviewed on appeal, must conform to the requirement that they not ‘deviat[e] materially’ from
amounts awarded in like cases. . . . That New York has chosen to tie its damages ceiling to awards
traditionally recovered in similar cases, rather than to a legislatively determined but inflexible
monetary sum, is none of our concern.” (internal citations omitted)).
389. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1458 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The legislative history . . .
does not clearly describe a judgment that § 901(b) would operate as a limitation on New York’s
statutory damages.” (emphasis added)).
390. Id. at 1457.
391. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b).
392. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457-58 n.16 (Stevens, J., concurring).
393. Id. at 1439 (“By its terms, [§ 901(b)] precludes a plaintiff from ‘maintain[ing]’ a class
action seeking statutory penalties.”); id. at 1440 (“But even accepting the dissent’s account of the
Legislature’s objective at face value, it cannot override the statute’s clear text.”); id. at 1440-41
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shift the judicial balance of power in favor of protecting the uniform
application of the Federal Rules, placed in jeopardy by the unpredictable
accommodation of federal and state interests on a case-by-case basis.
Although New York’s CPLR § 901(b) may be outcome
determinative—because, as acknowledged by Justice Stevens, “[i]t may
be that without class certification, not all of the potential plaintiffs would
bring their cases”394—the rule is not integrally bound up in the scope of
the remedy of statutory damages.395 In focusing on whether § 901(b) is
“sufficiently intertwined” with a New York state substantive remedy,
Justice Stevens employed distinctively procedural norms in concluding
that § 901(b)’s legislative history “reveals a classically procedural
calibration of making it easier to litigate claims in New York courts
(under any source of law) only when it is necessary to do so, and not
making it too easy when the class tool is not required.”396 Again,
emphasizing the distinctly procedural norms underlying § 901(b), he
asserted: “The mere fact that a state law is designed as a procedural rule
suggests it reflects a judgment about how state courts ought to operate
and not a judgment about the scope of state-created rights and
remedies.”397 His opinion cited Professor Ely’s distinction between
“‘procedural effects,’ affecting the way in which litigation is conducted,
and ‘substantive effects,’ affecting society’s distribution of risks and
rewards.”398 Section 901(b) is not, in Justice Stevens’s view, one of
those “rare state rules that, although ‘procedural’ in the ordinary sense of

(“The dissent’s approach of determining whether state and federal rules conflict based on the
subjective intentions of the state legislature is an enterprise destined to produce ‘confusion worse
confounded,’ (citing Sibbach [v. Wilson & Co.], 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). It would mean, to begin
with, that one State’s statute could survive pre-emption (and accordingly affect the procedures in
federal court) while another State’s identical law would not, merely because its authors had different
aspirations.”).
394. Id. at 1459 n.18 (Stevens, J., concurring).
395. Id. at 1458 (“As Justice Ginsburg carefully outlines, . . . § 901(b) was ‘apparently’
adopted in response to fears that the class-action procedure, applied to statutory penalties, would
lead to ‘annihilating punishment of the defendant’ [quoting New York State legislative history].
But statements such as these are not particularly strong evidence that § 901(b) serves to define who
can obtain a statutory penalty or that certifying such a class would enlarge New York’s remedy.
Any device that makes litigation easier makes it easier for plaintiffs to recover damages.”). To
further support his view that the legislative history does not clearly show that § 901(b) was intended
to limit New York’s damage remedy, Justice Stevens also noted that “Section 901(b) . . . is not
directed to the conduct of persons but is instead directed to New York courts.” Id. at 1458, n.16
(Stevens, J., concurring).
396. Id. at 1459.
397. Id. at 1457.
398. Id. at 1457; Ely, supra note 50, at 724.
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the term, operate to define the rights and remedies available in a
case.”399
It is unclear how the recent succession of Justice Elena Kagan to
the seat formerly occupied by Justice Stevens will affect the delicate
balance in favor of procedural uniformity. Both jurists are liberals but,
as previously noted, the positions taken by the Justices in Gasperini and
Shady Grove do not appear to be driven by political ideology. And,
given the lengthy intervals between major Court pronouncements on
“Erie” doctrine, the Court may not revisit another “Erie” issue soon.
Justice Stevens’s moderating influence on Gasperini, in shifting the
judicial balance of power back toward federal uniformity, may be felt for
some time to come.
V. CONCLUSION: DOES SHADY GROVE YIELD A PRINCIPLED APPROACH
TO THE REA BRANCH OF “ERIE-HANNA” REMOVED FROM POLITICS?
Principled guidance in applying “Erie-Hanna” doctrine that seems
to emerge from Shady Grove is contained in Justice Stevens’s
concurrence, a pivotal opinion that lies at the Court’s center between the
plurality and the dissent, sharing certain principles with each. First,
Hanna’s bifurcated approach that applies an REA analysis to the Federal
Rules and a separate RDA analysis to the unguided Erie choice survives.
Second, although Justice Stevens shares the plurality’s “plain text”
approach, he applies it to the state, rather than the federal, rule under the
“substantive rights” proviso to determine whether the purpose of the rule
is “substantive” or “procedural,” and only as a default when legislative
intent behind the state rule is ambiguous. Thus, in determining whether
a conflict exists between the Federal Rule and state law, courts should
look to the purpose behind each rule as indicated by the text of the rules
and their legislative intent. When the legislative history is inconclusive,
the court should “respect the plain textual reading” of the rules400 as a
default principle. Third, the REA’s “substantive rights” proviso serves
as an independent check on the federal rulemaking power so that,
according to Justice Stevens, “[w]hen a federal rule appears to abridge,
enlarge, or modify a substantive right, federal courts must consider
whether the rule can reasonably be interpreted to avoid that
impermissible result.”401 But the proviso is not a very potent check,
because “substantive rights” encompasses only state law that defines
399. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1455 (Stevens J., concurring).
400. Id. at 1459-60.
401. Id. at 1452.
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rights and remedies and state procedure that is intimately bound up with
such substantive state law.402 It will be a rare Federal Rule that qualifies
under § 2072(a) as a rule of practice and procedure—because it “really
regulates procedure”—but is invalid because it violates the strictures of
§ 2072(b).403 In the words of Justice Stevens: “Simply because a rule
should be read in light of federalism concerns, it does not follow that
courts may rewrite the rule.”404 This narrow construction of “substantive
rights” accords significant weight to the policy of Federal Rules
uniformity—not as much as the plurality, but more than the dissent.
From the larger perspective of the swinging pendulum of judicial
federalism that has characterized the evolution of Erie jurisprudence,
Shady Grove has moved the pendulum back toward the federal interest
in procedural uniformity. In Justice Ginsburg’s words, the Court
“veer[ed]” from Gasperini’s approach of narrowly interpreting Federal
Rules to avoid conflict with important state regulatory interests.405
Shady Grove marks a return to Hanna’s affirmation of the importance of
federal procedural uniformity in calibrating the judicial balance of power
between federal and state interests embedded in the REA.406
Essentially, Shady Grove represents a return to a modified formalist
approach to interpreting procedural rules, according considerable—but
not determinative—weight to the text of rules, state and federal, to
achieve greater predictability in the application of the Federal Rules.
This approach recognizes a normative difference between “substance”
and “procedure,” although individual rules may contain varying
combinations of substantive and procedural norms and, therefore, the
substance-procedure line will be drawn differently depending on the
normative mix and the doctrinal purpose for making the particular
characterization. Even Justice Ginsburg employed the norms of
substance and procedure to calibrate the balance between federal and
state interests when she commented that “[t]he fair and efficient conduct
of class litigation is the legitimate concern of Rule 23; the remedy for an
infraction of state law, however, is the legitimate concern of the State’s
lawmakers and not of the federal rulemakers.”407

402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
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Id. at 1458.
Id. at 1454 n.10.
Id. at 1456.
Id. at 1463-64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1453 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 1466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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The plurality and the dissent reflected less an ideological divide
between the Justices408 than a principled disagreement about federalism
and the appropriate balance between procedural uniformity and
sensitivity to state substantive interests. The Shady Grove majority
reaffirmed the value of procedural uniformity. Procedural uniformity
matters because, normatively, “procedure” matters.

408. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion favored the plaintiff’s litigation advantage in maintaining
a class action under Rule 23. Id. at 1431-42. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, as in Gasperini, favored
the defendant and New York’s tort reform policy. Id. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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